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RECENT DECISIONS
MUTUAL FuNDs -

CAPITAl. GAINs DISTRIBUTIONS TREATED AS PRINCIPAL

INCOME ACT. - Alice Brock, the testatrix,
died September 14, 1939. By her will, she created a perpetual trust of her
residuary estate. She directed that certain fixed sums, totaling $18,700, be paid
annually from the trust income to seven primary beneficiaries; any trust income
in excess of this amount be paid annually to two secondary beneficiaries; and
any income released from the trust, by the death or deaths of any, and finally all,
of the primary and secondary beneficiaries, be paid forever in equal shares to
Bryn Mawr College and the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts. The
annual income from this trust presently 'exceeds $18,700; the excess being paid
to the appellant income beneficiary. On September 3, 1964, the trustees purchased seven shares of the capital stock of Philadelphia Fund, Inc. (hereinafter
Fund), a mutual fund and regulated investment company. On September 30,
1964, the trsstees received from the Fund a distribution of $1.05. The authorizing resolution of the Fund described this distribution as a quarterly distribution
of 7 cents per share out of ordinary net income and 8 cents per share payable
from realized capital gains. The resolution further provided for payment of
such distribution in cash or additional shares of stock, at the option of the receiving stockholders. The trustees elected to receive payment in cash and received 49 cents designated "ordinary net income" and 56 cents designated "realized capital gains." The trustees then filed an account in the Orphans' Court
of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, wherein the entire distribution of $1.05 was
allotted to income. Bryn Mawr College fied objections to this allocation on the
ground that the amount of distribution from "realized capital gains" should be
distributed to principal. The Orphans' Court sustained Bryn Mawr's objection.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Judge Roberts dissenting, affirmed and
held: a distribution made by a mutual fund or regulated investment company,'
the source of which distribution is "realized capital gains," is properly allocable
to principal under section 5(3) rather than section 5(1) of the Pennsylvania
Principal and Income Act of 1947.2 In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281
(1966).
A typical mutual fund is an open-end diversified management investment
company.' Its business is to select, buy, hold, and sell corporate stocks and other
securities.4 The fund's income is twofold. It derives income from interest and
dividends on the securities in its portfolio and gains or profits from advantageous
UNDER THE UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND

1

Hereinafter "mutual funds" will mean a regulated investment company under the

Investment 'Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789-847, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).

2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1964). The Pennsylvania statute is substantially the
same as the UnForat PmNCIPAL AND INcomE AcT § 5 (1931).
3
[The fund is called] "open-end" because the capital of the fund grows with each
new share sold and issued, and declines with each share redeemed. "Diversified"
because fund investments are not heavily concentrated in individual issues. '"Ianagement" because the investments are not fixed, nor are they alterable only under rigidly
defined conditions. "Companies" as a generic term to include trusts or other legal
forms a fund can assume.
Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. Rav. 181, 182 n.3 (1961).
4 Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21, 24 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
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sales of its securities.5 This income, after deduction of management fees, is
distributed to the stockholders in two distinct dividends - cash and capital gains.'
The confusion presently begirding this area of dividend allocation has
been caused, to a large extent, by the unique nature of a mutual fund. The
principal issue is whether a mutual fund is analogous to an ordinary business
corporation (a separate entity) or to a common trust fund (a mere conduit).
The resolution of this issue is crucial. Under the separate entity theory, sales of
securities by a mutual fund are treated as sales from inventory, and thus the
gains from such sales are ordinary income to the trust allocable to the life income
beneficiary. Under the conduit theory, however, such gains are treated as returns of capital and are thus allocable to principal, in the same manner as if
the trustee had invested directly rather than through a mutual fund intermediary.7
judge Roberts, in his dissent in Brock, argued that the conduit theory was
inapplicable and that mutual fund distributions should be governed by the
separate entity theory. The basic thesis of the separate entity theory is that the
portfolio securities of a mutual fund are inventory or stock in trade.' In Lovett
Estate (No. 2),' the Orphand Court of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, stated:
The portfolio assets of an investment company are not regarded as
permanent assets of fixed capital by the managers of the company; the
securities held are treated by the managers as funds to be turned over in
the normal management of the business. Selling a portfolio asset is but
a normal incident of the business. The managers of an investment company must: (1) select, (2) buy, (3) hold, (4) sell various issues of securities
and stock, depending on market trend, price, indicated earnings, dividend
potentials and other factors, in short, they "buy the market." The gain
resulting from turning over of any portfolio asset by an investment company
is income occurring in the ordinary conduct and course of such business. 10
The "stock in trade" view is substantiated by the balance sheets of a mutual
fund. Mutual funds carry their portfolio assets at market value rather than cost,
a practice rarely used'in the case of capital assets.' This concept of mutual funds
as traders in securities, with the portfolio as its stock in trade, has been followed
by courts in several jurisdictions. 2
5 See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 511 (1964).
6 A mutual fund must designate its dividends as either income or capital gains. 54 Stat.
821, 15 U.S.O. § 80a-19 (1964). The fund cannot offset investment losses (capital losses)
against investment income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 852 (a) (1).
7

Note, Trusts -

Mutual Funds -

Allocation of Capital Gains Distributions, 18 Sw.

L.J. 508, 510 (1964).
8 See BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 858 (2d ed. 1962); Young, A Dissent on
Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 280 (1949).
9

78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).

10 Id. at 24.

11 See Cohan and Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment
of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 157, 182-83

(1957); Young, supra note 8.
12 In Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1960), the
court quoted with approval Lovett Estate (No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21, 24 (Orphans' Ct.
1951): "Selling a portfolio asset is but a normal incident in the business." This view was
concurred in by 74 HARV. L. R-v; 796 (1961). In In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127,
144, 123 N.W.2d 69, 80 (1963), the court said, "In other words, the'securities held which
are bought and sold in the normal course of business of an investment company constitute
... its stock in trade." Briel v. Moody, 77 N.J. Super. 306, 186 A.2d 314 (Super. Ct. 1962).
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The argument in favor of the conduit theory, advanced by the majority in
Brock, is a persuasive one."3 The conduit theory focuses on the substance, rather
than the form, of a mutual fund's activities. This theory views the investor,
rather than the mutual fund, as the real party in interest. Such a view is substantiated by the method of evaluating mutual fund shares. The shares are
evaluated as if each stockholder owned a pro rata share of the portfolio.' 4 Thus,
an investment in a mutual fund is, in substance, the same as if the shareholder
had invested the amount of his pro rata share in securities directly. The mutual
fund is held to be a mere conduit for management purposes.
The argument that a mutual fund is a mere conduit is reinforced by certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.5 Under the IRC, mutual
funds which distribute at least ninety percent of their net investment income
(income from interest and dividends) to their shareholders annually are not
taxed on such income. 6 Instead, the shareholder receiving the dividend pays
the federal income tax on it." Likewise, the IRC provides that distributed capital
gains dividends shall be treated by the shareholders as long term capital gains.1"
Thus, for federal tax purposes, the mutual fund is viewed as a mere conduit, the
investor being the real party in interest. 9
The last argument in favor of the conduit theory centers on the unique
nature of a mutual fund.20 A mutual fund is organized in corporate form. A
In Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Braman, 111 N.J. Eq. 191, 194, 161 Atl. 674, 675
(Ch. 1932), the court held that dividends on the entire stock of the corporation owned by
the testator, devised in trust for life tenants' benefit, was income distributable to life tenants.
The court stated, "The Alwyn Corporation dealt in securities. Securities were its, stock in
trade . . . as shoes or hats are the commodities of commercial companies." In In re Byrne's
Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 452, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (Surr. Ct. 1948), the court equated the activity
of a mutual fund with that of a corporation engaged in the buying and selling of real estate.
When such a corporation distributes the profits from the sale of property it is distributing
income and not capital.
13 The conduit theory has received support from a number of commentators. See Lobell,
supra note 3, at 186-88. Lobell views a mutual fund as a cluster of individual service arrangea mere conduit.
ments, its function being the same as a private investment counsellor See generally Ewart, Principal and Income Problems of Trustees with Mutual Fund Dividends, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1025 (1956); Putney, Capital Gain Dividends: Should They
be Allocated to Income or Principal, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 22 (1956); Wentworth, Recent
Developments Relating to the Treatment of Investment Company Capital Gains Distributions
by Fiduciaries,49 MAss. L.Q. 147 (1964); Note, supra note 7, at 510-14 (1964).
14 The per share value of the fund is equivalent to the net market value of the fund's
portfolio, including both net unrealized capital gains and gains which are realized but undistributed, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Ignoring nominal management
fees, any net capital gain of the fund results in an identical proportionate gain in the value
of the mutual fund shares. Likewise, any distribution of realized capital gains necessarily
must cause a reduction in per share value which is identical in amount to the per share
distribution. Note, supra note 7, at 511 (1964).
15 INT. REV. 'CODE OF 1954, §§ 851-55.
16 Id. § 852(a)(1),(b) (2) (D).
17 26 C.F.R. § 1.852-4(a) (1966).
18 INT. Rav. CODE- OF 1954, § 852(b) (3) (B).
In their treatment of mutual fund earnings and gains, both the Investment
19
Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code seek to avoid creating any fundamental
difference between the consequences of owning securities outright or through ownership of shares in a mutual fund. Thus the Internal Revenue Code does not
recognize the investment company as a separate tax entity with respect to dividends
and capital gains so long as they are distributed annually. Instead, the investment
company is treated as a conduit, without legal significance as far as the assessment
of such taxes is concerned. Wentworth, supra note 13, at 151-52.
As a business enterprise the typical fund is unique from the moment of its
20
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close analysis of the fund's purpose and activities, however, reveals essential
deviations from the ordinary corporate enterprise. As one commentator recently
noted:
The more, deeply one analyzes the mutual fund institution, its genesis,
the expectations and understandings inherent in it, its ethical and contractual
framework, the more one is forced to conclude that many doctrines evolved
to fit the usual type of associative enterprise do not fit the fund. . . . In
inspecting both judicial and legislative approaches to fund problems, we
have seen examples of the ineptness of various corporate concepts - both
of operations and control - applied to the mutual fund. The danger in
that kind of approach is not merely in the harm that it may do, but in
the good it does not do. For the fullest potentials for effective and livable
regulation can be realized only by accepting, at the very outset, the fact
that one is dealing with a set of relationships that do not lose either their
personal character or their essentially personal ethical and conceptual
21
framework because they are combined in an associative enterprise form.
(Emphasis added.)
A striking example of a mutual fund's uniqueness is that it cannot offset its
investment losses against investment income under the IRC.' In contrast, an
ordinary business corporation will always offset its investment losses against
operating income, and only the balance will be treated as net earnings available
for distribution.23 It is submitted that the mutual fund is a unique business
entity and should be treated as such. The doctrines evolved to govern the ordinary business corporation do not fit the fund and should not be applied.
Though the problem in In re Brock involved the nature of a mutual fund,
the court based its decision on an interpretation of section 5 of the Pennsylvania
Principal and Income Act.24 The court sought to determine whether capital
gains distributions fall within the provisions of section 5(1) or section 5(3)
of this act. Section 5 ( 1 ) deals with stock dividends, cash dividends, and optional
dividends.25 The court held that the exception clause in the second sentence of
inception, the circumstances of its formation to some extent foreshadowing its essential character and its difference from other types of companies. Lobell, supra note
3, at 184.
21 Id. at 216-17.
22 INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954, § 852(a) (1),(b) (2) (D). If a mutual fund wishes to avoid
paying tax on its investment income, which it must do in order to survive in the competitive
fieldit must distribute ninety percent of that income without deductions for current net
losses on sales of investments.
23 Brief for Appellee, p. 11, In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281 (1966).
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1964).
25 Section 5(1) provides:
Corporate distributions made to a trustee in the shares of the distributing corporation, however described or designated by the distributing corporation,shall be deemed
principal but if the number of shares of any class distributed to shareholders of such
class is six percent (6%) or less of the number of shares of that class outstanding
on the record date for such distribution, the shares so distributed shall be deemed
income. Except as provided above and in other subsections of this section all dividends payable otherwise than in shares of the distributing corporation, including
ordinary and extraordinary cash dividends and dividends payable in shares or other
securities or obligations of corporations other than the distributing corporation, shall
be deemed income. Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend,
either in cash or in the shares of the distributing corporation, it shall be considered
as a cash dividend and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by the
trustee. (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1) (1964).
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section 5 (1), dealing with cash dividends in general, applies to the third sentence
dealing with optional dividends as well. Thus, the court would make the optional
dividend provision of 5 (1) applicable only if no other subsection provided to the
contrary. It is submitted that the third sentence of 5 (1) is complete in itself
and governs optional dividends exclusively. It was settled law prior to Pennsylvania's enactment of section 5 that optional dividends are to be considered as
cash dividends." Thus, in order for the last sentence in section 5 (1)27 to be
meaningful, the Pennsylvania legislature must have intended optional dividends to
be treated in their own distinct manner, without being governed by the second
sentence of 5 (1) concerning cash dividends in general. It can be argued that the
last sentence of 5(1) was added only to strengthen the previous case law interpretation of optional dividends as cash dividends, and thus the legal implications are to be gleaned from the second sentence of 5 (1). This position, however,
is -untenablein light of the words, "and deemed income." Had the legislature intended the second sentence of section 5 (1) to govern optional dividends, the
qualifying phrase, "and deemed income," in the last sentence of 5 (1) would
have been superfluous. The last sentence of 5 (1) is clear, precise, and complete;
it does not require other subsections for explication. 8
After superficially disposing of section 5 (1), the court in Brock held that
the second and third sentences of section 5(3)2" control capital gains distributions of a mutual fund. It is submitted that the court erred in this determination.
Section 5 (3) applies only to the apportionment of dividends issued by the normal
corporate enterprise. It has no application to capital gains distributions of a
mutual fund. ° The phrase, "return of capital," in the second sentence of 5 (3),

26 See, e.g., Hyde v. Holmes, 198 Mass. 287, 84 N.E. 318 (1908); Davis v. Jackson, 152
Mass. 58, 25 N.E. 21 (1890); In re Hurd's Will, 203 Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1953);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRuSTS § 236(c) (1959); BOGERT, Op. cit. supra note 8, § 846;
3 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 236.4 (2d ed. 1956); Annot, 44 A.L.R.2d 1286 (1955).
27
Where the trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend, either in cash or
in the shares of the distributing corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend
and deemed income, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee. (Emphasis
added.) See note 25 supra.
28 In In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123, N.W.2d 69 (1963), the decision was
based on a provision of a Minnesota statute [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.47(4) (Supp. 1965)]
which is substantially the same as the last sentence in § 5(1) of the Pennsylvania Principal
and Income Act. In Summerfield Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 526, 529 (Orphans' Ct. 1962),
the court stated in dictum: "The provisions of section 5(1) of the [Pennsylvania] Principal
and Income Act are clear and unequivocal."
29 Section 5(3) provides:
Where the assets of a corporation are liquidated, wholly or partially, amounts paid
upon corporate shares as cash dividends, declared before such, liquidation began,
or as arrears of cumulative preferred, or guaranteed dividends shall be deemed
income, all other amounts paid, upon corporate shares on disbursement of the corporate assets to the stockholders shall be deemed principal. All disbursements of
corporate assets to the stockholders, whenever made, which are designated by the
corporation as a return of capital or division of corporate property, shall be deemed
principal. Any profit or loss resulting from the sale or liquidation of corporate shares
shall enure to or fall upon principal. (Emphasis added.) PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§ 3470.5(3) (1964).
30 In re Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123 N.W.2d 69 (1963), involved a statute
containing sections [MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.47(3), (4) (Supp. 1965)] identical with the
second sentence of § 5(3) and the third sentence of § 5(1) respectively. The Minnesota
court did not deem § 501.47(3) worthy of discussion but instead held that § 501.47(4) was
controlling.
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means a return of capital invested."- That is clearly not the situation in In re
Brock, as the trustee did not receive a return of his initial capital investment.
The final provision of 5(3) refers to the sale or liquidation of treasury shares,
that is, shares of a corporation's own stock held by that corporation. This sentence
provides that those dividends which represent gains from the sale or liquidation
of the corporation's own stock (treasury shares) are to be deemed principal.
It is submitted that the court in Brock ignored the statute's intended scope and
applied the final provision out of context to mutual funds. Mutual fund distributions which represent gains from the sale of stock and securities held by the fund
are not analogous to those corporate dividends which represent gains from the
sale of treasury stock.
The policy considerations which the court discusses in In re Brock are of
the utmost significance in the determination of dividend allocation. The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that when capital gains distributions of a mutual
fund are allocable to the income life tenant, a remainder to charity will not
qualify for a charitable deduction under the federal estate tax law."2 In the
Greater Philadelphia area alone, at least fifty-nine estates, involving taxes in
excess of $3,600,000, are affected by this ruling.3" This tremendous impact on
charitable trusts almost compels the conclusion that capital gains distributions of
a mutual fund be allocated to principal. 4 Another policy argument in favor of
allocation to principal is that both capital gains and capital losses should inure to
the same beneficiary. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently noted:
It is argued that if capital gain distributions . .. [are] paid to the income
beneficiary, the trust principal will inevitably suffer in years of losses, which
must be expected even in an era generally inflationary, so that, in effect,
the investment company shares may become a wasting investment. 5
Allocating capital gains distributions to the income life tenant will result in
31 E.g., such as distributions received on corporate reorganization, on proceeds of the
forced sale of a capital asset, or as the result of a true stock split. See Steel Estate, 32 Pa.
D. & C.2d 553 (Orphans' Ct. 1964). In Steel, the court held that the distribution by DuPont
of its stockholdings in General Motors, pursuant to a court divestiture order, constituted a
partial liquidation of the assets of DuPont within the meaning of the second sentence of § 5(3).
32 Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 77. The court in In re Brock noted that under
this ruling:
[Wihere a will creates a trust with income payable to someone for life and the
principal thereafter to a charity and the trustee is empowered to invest in mutual
or regulated investment company funds, the remainder to charity will not qualify
for the charitable deduction under federal estate tax law if, under the applicable
state law, any capital-gains distribution on the shares of the mutual fund or regulated
investment company would be allocated to income and distributed to the income
beneficiaries. In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281, 282, n.4 (1966).
33 Ibid.
34 The Introductory Statement to N.J. Rv. STAT. § 3A:14A-5, p. 13 (Supp. 1965)
states:
The change in Section 5 of the [Principal and Income] Act [classifying capital
gains distributions of a mutual fund as principal] is proposed as a result of Briel v.
Moody .... Under this decision where property is transferred or bequeathed in trust
to one for life and on his death to charity, then if the trust may be invested in
shares of an investment trust, no charitable deduction is allowed under the income,
estate and gift tax laws. Rev. Rul. 60-385.
See Shattuck, Capital
35 Tait v. Peck,, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707, 712 (1963).
Contra,
Gain Distributions: Principal or Incore? 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 160 (1949).
Young, supra note 8.
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the anomalous situation that losses resulting from the sale of securities would
be borne by the remainderman, while the profits of such sales would go to the
life tenant. 6 Since remaindermen have to bear any net capital loss which might
occur,3" it is reasonable to hold that they should be entitled to any net capital gain.
It is submitted that the court in In re Brock could have reached the same

desirable result that it did, without violating the provisions of section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act. This result could have been achieved

by a fuller utilization of the conduit theory. The mutual fund is a unique
entity. The "many doctrines evolved to fit the usual type of associative enterprise do not fit the fund."3 " The conduit theory recognizes this uniqueness and

properly classifies the mutual fund as a mere conduit for management purposes.
The mutual fund is not analogous to an ordinary business corporation and the
doctrines evolved to govern the normal business corporation should not be
superimposed upon a mutual fund. Since section 5 deals only with the dividend
allocations of an ordinary business corporation," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
could have held that due to the unique nature of a mutual fund, section 5 did
not apply at all. The court then would have been free of statutory restrictions
and able to adopt completely the approach of the conduit theory under which
capital gains distributions axe classified as principal.

The conduit theory and section 5 cannot logically coexist. The conduit
theory asserts that a mutual fund is not an ordinary business corporation, whereas
section 5 is applicable only to ordinary business corporations. It is submitted

that the court in In re Brock should have clarified this area of law by holding
that the conduit theory is applicable, but that section 5 is not."' Though the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have erroneously interpreted section 5 of the
Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act, the real impact of In re Brock is the
court's acceptance of the conduit theory.
James H. Seckinger

36 In re Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281, 290 (1966).
37 As the portfolio assets decrease in value, the market value of the mutual fund shares
decreases proportionally.
38 See note 20 supra.
39 Lobell, supra note 3, at 216. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
40 See notes 25, 29 supra.
41 This view is expressed in the REVISED UNIFORMo PRINCIPAL AND INcOME ACT § 6.
The REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 6(c) gives mutual fund distributions
their own separate classification consonant with the conduit theory.: Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 75B, § 6(c) (1965), and New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:14A-5(d) (Supp.
1965), also have passed legislation granting mutual fund distributions their own separate
classification consistent with the conduit theory, but distinct from such sections as 5(1) and
5(3) of the Pennsylvania Principal and Income Act. The trend is definitely toward the view
that sections such as 5(1) and 5(3) do not apply, but rather that mutual funds should have
their own classification. States that have enacted such legislation are: Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-113(1) (Supp. 1965); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.06 (Supp.
1965); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-1006(c) (Supp. 1965); Kansas, KAw. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-905(c) (Supp. 1965); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. § 9:2149C (1965); Maine,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4054 (1964); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 75B, § 6(c)
(1965); Michigan, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.79(6) (c) (Supp. 1965); New Jersey, N.J. Rnv.
STAT. § 3A:14A-5(d) (Supp. 1965); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-5(e) (Supp.
1965); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 67-509(c) (Supp. 1965); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-706(1) (Supp. 1966); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 231.40(5)(a) (Supp. 1966);
Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-379(c) (Supp. 1965).
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS BANKRUPTCY HOLDER OF A PERFECTED
SECURITY INTEREST UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DENIED RIGHT To RECLAIM COLLATERAL FROM BANKRUPT DEBTOR IN CHAPTER

X REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS.-During the summer and fall of 1964, Yale
Express System, Inc., (hereinafter Yale) purchased from Fruehauf Corporation
a total of fifty trailers and sixty-two truck bodies. Fruehauf sold these items on
credit, relying on Yale's apparent financial stability as published in a recent Dun

& Bradstreet Report. In February 1965, however, Fruehauf learned that the
financial report upon which it had relied was inaccurate. Instead of having a

million dollars profit for 1963, Yale had actually sustained a net loss. Fruehauf
thereupon entered into a security agreement with Yale waiving its asserted right to
reclaim the trailers and truck bodies' as consideration for Yale's executing, in
Fruehauf's favor, a security interest in the form of a chattel mortgage. Fruehauf
contended that this security interest, duly executed and filed in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the New York Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter the Code) constituted a valid purchase money security interest.' One
of the terms of this agreement provided that Fruehauf, the secured party, could
elect to repossess the collateral if a petition for reorganization should be filed by

or against Yale. When Yale filed such a petition for reorganization under
Chapter X of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,4 Fruehauf made a formal demand
upon Yale's trustee in bankruptcy for immediate repossession of the goods

described in the security agreement. Upon the trustee's refusal, Fruehauf brought
a petition for reclamation in the reorganization court. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied Fruehauf's petition and
held: the trucks and trailers purchased by Yale, the debtor, were "property of

the debtor" not subject to reclamation by the manufacturer which held a
perfected security interest under the Code. In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 250

F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).'
Chapter X of the Federal Bankruptcy Act deals with corporate reorganizations. The basic purpose of this chapter is to seek the rehabilitation, rather than
forced liquidation, of debtors.6 Its basic philosophy can be found in two sections
1 At this point the asserted right to reclaim did not arise from any security agreement.
Fruehauf contended that it could reclaim the trucks and trailers on the ground that it had
the right to rescind the transactions because of Yale's material misrepresentation of its financial
condition. Memorandum of Law of Petitioner Fruehauf, p. 7, In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.,
250 F. Supp. 249, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
2 N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302 and 9-304 [Hereinafter cited as UCO].
3 UCC § 9-107 defines a "purchase money security interest" as follows:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or

(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used.
Article 9 of the UCC does not recognize the traditional distinctions between security agreements. Instead, it covers all traditional types of security agreements with the one term "security interest." A purchase money security interest under the Code is simply a special type of
security interest. UCC § 9-312 (3)-(4) gives a purchase money security interest priority over
a security interest in after-acquired property.
4 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
5 An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is now pending. Letter from Attorneys for Petitioner, July 7, 1966, on file with the Notre Dame Lawyer.
6 In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 124 (1939), the Court said: "One

[Vol. 42 :258]

RECENT DECISIONS

dealing with the power of reorganization courts over a debtor's property. Section
116(4)' of the act gives reorganization courts power to enjoin any further proceedings against a debtor to enforce a lien until issuance of the court's final
decree approving a petition for reorganization. Section 148' makes an approval
of a petition for reorganization an automatic stay of any prior bankruptcy proceedings, equity receiverships, mortgage foreclosures, or other proceedings to enforce a lien against the debtor's property. Thus, the purpose of Chapter X is to
temporarily insulate the debtor from other proceedings. A debtor is given
additional time to regroup his assets, obtain other capital, and prepare a reorganization plan, with the hope that by operating under the new plan the
debtor may once again conduct a profitable business.'
In a secured transaction, the secured creditor acquires a property right in
the collateral. In the event of bankruptcy proceedings, he is placed in a class
above general creditors. During regular liquidation bankruptcy proceedings
(those under neither Chapter X nor Chapter XI), the secured creditor is entiled to payment from liquidation of the collateral." During Chapter X reorganization proceedings, however, a secured creditor is not entitled to reclaim
his property merely by showing that he is a secured creditor. The general rule
governing petitions for reclamation in Chapter X reorganization proceedings
was set forth in In re Lake's Laundry, Inc.' In that case, the Second Circuit
held that reclamation will be granted against a debtor if the petitioner is able

of the purposes of § 77B [the forerunner of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act] was to avoid
the consequences to debtors and creditors of foreclosures, liquidations, and forced sales with
their drastic deflationary effects." For a similar philosophy of the purpose of Chapter X, see
In re Embassy Co., 58 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mo. 1945); In re 325 East 72d St., 53 F. Supp.
997 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); In re Warren Bros., 43 F. Supp. 173 (D. Mass. 1942). For a discussion of § 77B, its faults and subsequent refinements into Chapter X, see 6 COL-mER, BANKRUPTCY 110.05 (14th ed. 1965).
7 Section 116 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 884-85 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516(4)
(1964), provides:
Upon the approval of a petition, the judge may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties hereinabove and elsewhere in this chapter conferred and
unposed upon him and the court-....
(4) in addition to the relief provided by section 11 of this Act, enjoin or stay
until final decree the commencement or continuation of a suit against the debtor
or its trustee or any act or proceeding to enforce a lien upon the property of the
debtor.
8 Section 148 of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
Until otherwise ordered by the judge, an order approving a petition shall operate as a stay of a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity receivership proceeding, and of any act or other proceeding to enforce a lien against the
debtor's property.
52 Stat. 888 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
9 The difference between a Chapter X reorganization and a Chapter XI arrangement is
the comprehensiveness of the plan. Chapter X encompasses a more thorough plan of reorganization and protects widely scattered creditors and stockholders. SEC v. American Trailer Rentals
Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); SEC v.
United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); SEC v. Crumpton Builders,
Inc., 337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).
10 Bankruptcy Act § 57(h), 52 Stat. 866 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1964). See Goggin
v. California Labor Div., 336 U.S. 118 (1949) (holder of a statutory lien held to outrank
unsecured creditor).
11 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935). The doctrine of Lake's
Laundry has been followed in a number of subsequent cases. E.g., In re White Plains Ice
Serv., Inc., 109 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1940); In re Newjer Contracting Co., 154 F. Supp. 567
(D.N.J. 1957); In re Sun Cab Co., 67 F. Supp. 137 (D.D.C. 1946).
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to show that the property he seeks to reclaim belongs to him. 2 Thus, the issue
is whether a petitioner has title to, or merely a lien on or interest in, the property
sought to be reclaimed.
In determining this crucial issue, reorganization courts must look to the
appropriate state law governing secured transactions. State laws generally give
conditional vendors title to collateral. Likewise, state laws generally provide
that a chattel mortgagee has only a lien on property. In the usual reorganization
proceeding, therefore, a conditional vendor is granted reclamation, whereas a
chattel mortgagee is not. 3 Thus, in order to be successful in its petition for reclamation, Fruehauf had to prove that the goods sought to be reclaimed were
its property and not that of the debtor, Yale.
It was in proving this contention that Fruehauf encountered difficulty.
Fruehauf's security agreement with Yale was executed in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the New York Uniform Commercial Code. Although
it replaces the concept of chattel mortgage with the broader concept of "security
interest," the Code still allows parties to use the traditional forms of security agreements. 4 Fruehauf's security agreement was in the form of a chattel mortgage.
Therefore, under traditional concepts of chattel mortgage, Fruehauf would not
have had title to the collateral and would not have been allowed to reclaim it.
Fruehauf's main argument in seeking reclamation was that Code section
9-202 abolishes the distinction between title and lien. Hence, the fact that title
was in Yale, the debtor, should not bar reclamation in a Chapter X proceeding.
Section 9-202 of the Code states: "Each provision of this Article with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor." Fruehauf asserted that since the Code no longer
recognizes the distinction between title and lien as material to the rights, obligations, and remedies arising out of secured transactions, the title-lien distinction
should not be material in granting or denying petitions for reclamation in
Chapter X bankruptcy proceedings. Fruehauf further contended that since
it had a valid purchase money security interest under the Code, reclamation
should be granted if, under the equitable powers of the court, such a result
would serve justice.'
The problem which confronted the district court in Yale Express involved
the interplay of two statutes - the Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. The fact that the former is codified as state law, while the
latter is a federal statute complicated the problem. The Code, being state law,
12
13
14

In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., supra note 11, at 327-28.
Id. at 328.
UCO § 9-102(2) provides:
This Article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge,
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust,
conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security.
The Comment to UCC § 9-101 states:
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create
security interests in personal property and fixtures, and the single term "security interest" substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms which has grown up at common
law and under a hundred-year accretion of statutes. This does not mean that the old
forms may not be used ....
15 Reply Memorandum of Law of Petitioner Fruehauf, p. 6.
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is not authority for solving problems governed by the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
Neither the code drafters nor the state legislatures that adopted the Code can tell
bankruptcy courts, which are governed by federal statutes, what to do.
Yale Express raised the interesting question of the Code's application in
bankruptcy proceedings. The 'Code, which has become effective in almost every
state, replaces existing state legislation dealing with security devices."8 Article
9, which deals with secured transactions, departs radically from traditional concepts of title and lien. The Code attempts to base its remedies on the factual circumstances of each transaction rather than on a technical inquiry into whether
the secured party has title to, or merely a lien on, the property in question.
A noted commentator in the field of secured transactions has stated that
the old title-lien distinction makes little sense when analyzed from the businessman's point of view." A businessman desiring to enter into a secured transaction should not be placed in jeopardy simply because the law governing conditional sales contracts developed differently from the law governing chattel
mortgages. Article 9 of the Code is the answer to the businessman's dilemma."8
This article develops different rules to be applied in different situations. These
rules do not depend on formal title-lien distinctions. Rather, the Code looks to
the relationship between the parties and the substantive basis of the transaction.
In all cases, the interest which the secured creditor obtains under the Code has
the same designation - a "security interest."' 9
Code section 9-202, which abolishes the title-lien distinction, is the focal
point of the Code's new theory of secured transactions. A comment to section
9-507 makes it clear that the Code drafters hoped this new theory would be
adopted by the bankruptcy courts:
But since this Article adopts neither a "title" nor a "lien" theory of security
interests . . . the granting or denying of, for example, petitions of reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings should not be influenced by speculations as to whether the secured party had "title" to the collateral or
"merely a lien." 20 (Emphasis added.)

The Code, then, adopts a new approach to secured transactions. If
bankruptcy courts continue to follow the rule of Lake's Laundry, they must look
to state law to determine a petitioner's rights. In those jurisdictions which have
adopted the Code, Article 9 is the state law governing secured transactions to
16 The Comment to UCO § 9-101 states that Article 9 "supersedes existing legislation
dealing with such security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's
liens and assignments of accounts receivable. .. ."
17 SPIVAK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 6 (Uniform Commercial Code, Practice Handbook 5,

1963).

18 Id. at 7.
19 UCO § 1-201(37) defines a security interest as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.... The term also includes any
interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to Article 9.
. . " For an example of the "substantive basis of the transaction," see Comments to UCC §§
9-101 and 9-109. For excellent discussions of UCC Article 9, see Coogan, A Suggested Analytical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 (1963);
Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the Code, 60 MICH. L. REV.
685 (1962); and Schwartz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code on Secured Financing
Transactions and Bankruptcy, 38 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 50 (1963).

20

UCC § 9-507, comment 1.
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which bankruptcy courts must look. As has been noted, Article 9 does away
with the traditional analysis of secured transactions in terms of title and lien.
All this article gives a secured party is a "security interest." The problem before
the court in Yale Express, therefore, was to choose between two conflicting sets
of laws. The court could have strictly adhered to the pre-Code bankruptcy precedents and have tried to determine, without the aid of current state law,
whether the secured party had title to, or a lien on, the collateral; or, it could
have adopted the new theory embodied in the Code, ignored the antiquated
title-lien distinction, and granted reclamation if such relief would have served
justice under the circumstances.
The court in Yale Express stated that Fruehauf's reliance on Article 9 of
the Code was "misplaced."'" It held that section 9-202 applied only to "the
rights, obligations and remedies which are provided by the Code itself, and none
of the Code provisions, separately or when read together, give a holder of a
chattel mortgage (or purchase money security interest) the right to reclaim
collateral from a debtor in Chapter X proceedings. " 22 The court felt that the
Code should not be allowed to encroach upon settled bankruptcy precedents.
Since the security agreement in Yale Express was in the form of a chattel mortgage
which, according to pre-Code state law, gave the mortgagee (or "secured party"
using Code terminology) a lien on the collateral, the district court followed
Lake's Laundry and denied reclamation.
A second reason given by the court in Yale Express for denying reclamation
was based on Code section 9-503.2" This section gives secured parties the right
to repossession with or without judicial process. Since a Chapter X proceeding
is clearly a judicial process, the court reasoned that the right to repossession should
be based on Chapter X bankruptcy precedents. The court cited with approval
the 1956 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission which stated:
"It is incredible that any court would ever construe the default provisions of
Code Article 9 as over-riding any provisions of existing assignment or insolvency
statutes." 24
Viewed narrowly, in terms of the Bankruptcy Act, the court's decision in
Yale Express denying petitioner's claim for reclamation was the only logical
holding. The Bankruptcy Act in many sections contains the words "property
of the debtor." The act thus implies that if the property is not that of the debtor
(i.e., if title is in another person), the provisions of the act will not be applicable.
Similarly, the distinction between property held by a debtor as a conditional
250 F. Supp. 249, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Ibid.
UCC § 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the
debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place
to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable and may dispose of
the collateral on the debtor's premises. ...
24 1956 N.Y. Report of Law Revision Commission, Report Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, p. 104.
21
22
23
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vendee and property mortgaged by him has ancient roots.2" Hence the timehonored concepts of title and lien are so firmly entrenched in legal thought
and the Bankruptcy Act that it is very unlikely a single Code section will easily
efface them. While the Code changes existing state law dealing with secured
transactions, it does not change federal bankruptcy precedents.
It is submitted that if the district court's decision in Yale Express is followed the law governing secured transactions will become static. In jurisdictions
where the Code is in effect, bankruptcy courts will not be able to look to Article
9 of the Code to determine whether a secured party has title to, or a lien on,
the collateral. Rather, bankruptcy reorganization courts faced with resolving
the title-lien dichotomy will have to look at state law as it existed prior to the
state's adoption of the Code. The outcome of this procedure will be the crystallization of pre-Code state laws dealing with secured transactions. The high
hopes of the Code drafters that the Code would abolish title-lien speculations
in reclamation proceedings will thus be frustrated. If bankruptcy courts in
the future choose to follow the lead of Yale Express, a large uncrossable gap
will result in the law. In determining whether a secured party has title to, or
a lien on, collateral, bankruptcy courts will have to overlook the state's adoption
of the Code and seek their answer in pre-Code state law.
This gap created in the law by Yale Express will have some very important
ramifications unless the Bankruptcy Act is amended. Every secured transaction
is entered into with the possibility of bankruptcy in mind. However, according
to the rationale of Yale Express, creditors who wish to enter into secured transactions will have to look to two different sets of laws. First, in order to make
sure his security interest is properly perfected, a creditor must comply with all
the requirements of the Code for a signed writing" and proper perfection."
Then, a secured creditor who is a seller desiring to protect himself in the event
of a Chapter X proceeding, will still have to use the time-honored forms of
conditional sales contracts to make certain that he retains title to the goods.2 8
The concept of title is steadily being eroded in the area of commercial law.
The Code drastically modifies the importance of title in the law of sales2 It makes
rights, duties and remedies dependent on the factual situation of each case
rather than an artificial inquiry into the location of title. The ordinary businessman should not be expected to have an attorney at his side every time he enters
into a secured transaction. In lessening the importance of title, the Code emphasizes the substantive basis of the transaction. This practical approach allows
25 In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 622
(1935).
26 UCC § 9-203.
27 UCC § 9-303.
28 A concomitant problem is that of voidable preferences. For a discussion of Article 9
secured transactions that might constitute voidable preferences, see 3 COLLIER, Op. Cit. supra
note 6, 1 60.51A (14th ed. 1966).
29

UCC § 2-401 provides in part:
Each provision of this Article [Article 2, Sales] with regard to the rights, obliga-

tions and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title.
For an excellent comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Sales Act,
see generally Whiteside, Uniform Commercial Code-Major Changes in Sales Law, 49 Ky.

L.J. 165 (1960).
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businessmen to conduct secured transactions on the basis of their reasonable
expectations. Thus, commercial transactions are not only considerably expedited, but they acquire a needed element of certainty.
Judge Learned Hand, in his dissenting opinion in Lake's Laundry, stated:
"'title' is a formal word for a purely conceptual notion; I do not know what
it means and I question whether anybody does .... ""0 It is submitted that
the vast amount of litigation over the location of title graphically illustrates the
unsatisfactory nature of such an inquiry. The Code, in doing away with formal
conceptions of title, codifies prevailing business practices. If there is to be uniformity in this area of commercial law, it is imperative that other laws dependent on the Code follow its leadership.
If bankruptcy courts refuse to follow the Code, which now represents state
law in the area of secured transactions, a large uncrossable gap will develop
between the law of secured transactions and the law of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
law depends, in great measure, on the location of title. In adopting the Code,
the vast majority of states have given their approval to a law of secured transactions which is not based on the location of title. It is submitted that the
Federal Bankruptcy Act should be amended to recognize the new theory
embodied in the Code.
William T. Coleman
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE EQUALLY AVAILABLE

TO THE

PROSECUTOR'S FAILURE
DEFENSE MAY

To

DISCLOSE EVIDENCE

CONSTITUTE

A VIOLATION OF

Milton Levin was indicted on a charge of grand larceny.
The indictment charged that Levin had conspired with certain union officials
to effect the corrupt acquittal of a union president on trial for perjury. In pursuance of this conspiracy, Levin allegedly received $35,000 to "fix" the necessary parties. The government's case contained several inconsistencies upon
which Levin built his defense.' Despite these inconsistencies, the jury was
allowed to find Levin guilty.2 Levin unsuccessfully sought collateral relief in a
habeas corpus proceeding on the theory of newly discovered evidence which the
government possessed during his trial and failed to disclose.3 The United States
DUE PROCESS.

-

30 In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 622 (1935).
1 One union official, Landriscina, testified that on the morning of February 12, 1959,
he gave Levin ten $1,000 bills. Later, Levin requested payment in smaller denominations
and was given $20 bills in exchange for the $1,000 bills. The remaining $25,000 was allegedly
delivered on the afternoon of February 13. However, two other union officials, Ashby and
Olson, recounted the events differently. They testified that Olson had obtained the entire
$35,000, in $1,000 bills, on the morning of February 13, and later that day, Ashby exchanged
the $1,000 bills for $20 bills. This money was then given to Landriscina to forward to Levin.
Levin also attempted to show that he was in Washington, D.C., only from the evening
of February 12, until the early afternoon of the following day. If this were true, he could
not have received any money from Landriscina on the morning of February 12.
2 The jury was allowed to find that Landriscina gave Levin $10,000 on the morning
of February 13. Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265, 269 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bazelon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999 (1965).
3 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287. 288 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This newly discovered
evidence consisted of a check drawn by the bank where the union officials obtained the
money to pay Levin. The check was drawn to replenish the bank's supply of $1,000 bills.
Levin argued that a replenishment would have been unnecessary if the $1,000 bills had been
exchanged for the $20 bills. There was also a statement of a bank official, interviewed by
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in reversing and remanding Levin's
conviction, held: the prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence, which, in the
context of the case, might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt
about defendant's guilt, was a violation of due process, notwithstanding the
fact that such evidence was equally available to the defense. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The duty of a criminal prosecutor discussed in Levin traces its genesis to
the fountainhead case of Mooney v. Holohan.4 Taken alone, Mooney is not a
startling case. The principle announced therein is quite fundamental: instigation of perjury by a prosecuting attorney to obtain a conviction is a violation
of due process which vitiates the proceedings. On its face, Mooney does not
appear to be the kind of case that lends itself to judicial extension. However,
Mooney is precisely that kind of case. From the elemental principle that a
fraudulent conviction is invalid, courts have developed a highly sophisticated
body of law dealing with problems far removed from the crude situation which
confronted the defendant in Mooney. Mooney's present-day progeny have
undergone such a complete metamorphosis that they resemble their distinguished
ancestor only insofar as they employ the same due process grounds for decision.
At the same time, the Mooney principle has been utilized to solve problems of
an essentially different nature.'
Mooney first spawned a line of cases which rounded out the notion of
fraudulent conviction. These cases paved the way for the extension to come.
In Napue v. Illinois,6 the assistant district attorney asked the chief witness if he
had been offered any consideration for his testimony. The witness's negative
reply was false and went uncorrected. The jury knew from previous testimony
that someone had offered the witness consideration; what they did not know
was that it was the prosecuting attorney. In this case, a lie bearing only on the witness's credibility was held sufficient to taint the conviction. Napue is best explained
in terns of the prosecutor's deliberate conduct rather than the testimony's prejudicial effect upon the defendant.' Also, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that a prosecutor cannot knowingly use perjured testimony even though such
testimony goes to the question of punishment rather than guilt.'
the defense, to the effect that he remembered Olson making the withdrawal, but he could
not remember Ashby making the exchange. There was no implication that the exchange
was not made, only that it was beyond recollection.

4 294 U.S. 103 (1935).

5 The fact that Mooney was based upon broad constitutional grounds may go far in
explaining this phenomenon. "Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle,
precludes defining, and thereby confining these standards of conduct more precisely than
to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of justice."'
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
6 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
7 As was noted in People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1956):
The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be
beyond the suspicion of reproach ....
It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore
upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is
a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case, the
district attorney has the responsibility and the duty to correct what -he knows to
be false and elicit the truth. Id. at 556-57, 136 N.E.2d at 854-, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 887.

8

Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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In Pyle v. Kansas,9 the inevitable question was raised. The defendant in
Pyle alleged that the state knowingly used perjured testimony and deliberately
suppressed favorable evidence. Suppression was clearly presented as a ground
for decision. However, since Pyle was amenable to proper disposition without
passing on suppression, the Supreme Court left the question for future determination. In United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 0 a federal district
court, faced with the issue of whether suppression taints a conviction, answered
in the affirmative. In this case, the prosecutor deliberately suppressed conclusive medical testimony, equally available to the defense, that the complainant
had not been raped. The court termed the prosecutor's conduct "shocking"
and granted relief in spite of a lack of due diligence by defendant's counsel.'
The rationale behind these cases rounds out the principle first enunciated
in Mooney that the prosecutor's undesirable, even outrageous, conduct is a fraud
which constitutes a stinging indictment against the state in its administration
of criminal justice. Such conduct violates the fundamental precepts of our legal
order and is therefore intolerable. When faced with such objectionable conduct
on the part of prosecutors, courts are apparently oblivious to other considerations,
viz., the prejudicial effect of the evidence and its availability to the criminal
accused. The reason for the rule in these fraud cases is that "mere admonitions
are insufficient to prevent repetition of the abuse." 2
That line of cases based upon the instigation of, knowing use of, or failure
to correct perjury had nearly run full course' when courts turned to the alternative ground of suppression, suggested in Pyle, to fashion a significant and
still-developing body of law. In United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,"4 the
petitioner was convicted of murder. In this case, the prosecutor failed to reveal
laboratory evidence which would have established defendant did not fire the
murder weapon. Under the indictment, the defendant's having fired the murder weapon would have made no difference as to guilt, but this information
would have been considerably important in fashioning punishment. Baldi, which
was decided on the authority of Mooney and Pyle, was grounded on the fraud
rationale. Obviously the fraud found in Baldi was of a different variety than
that present in either Mooney or Pyle.
Two years later, in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye,'" a defendant
was convicted of first degree murder. The defense was his testimony, corroborated by some witnesses and discredited by others, that he was drunk and drugged
and thus unable to formulate the necessary intent to commit first degree murder.
The prosecutor, after examining a witness who testified as to defendant's sobriety,
told the jury he could call other arresting officers who would give similar testi9 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
10 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.Ill.1949).
11 Id. at 387. Ragen isnot as clear a holding as could be desired. The prosecutor also
perjured himself and intimidated defendant's trial counsel. However, these matters were
not dwelt upon to any appreciable extent in the opinion. The court was concerned primarily
with the suppression issue.
12 Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961).
13 The case of misrepresentation logically belongs to this line. See text accompanying
note 15 infra.
14 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
15 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
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mony. In so doing, he failed to communicate to either defense counsel or the
court that at least one officer would testify that Thompson was under the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest. In Dye, the prosecutor not only
failed to disclose significant exculpatory evidence which he deemed irrelevant,
but he also made a misleading affirmative statement as to the nature of the
available but unused testimony. Regardless of the prosecutor's motives in withholding such significant testimony, his misrepresentation was found to be highly
misleading and prejudicial. Since there was no finding of fraud on the prosecutor's part, the decision could not have rested squarely on the fraud rationale.
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit granted relief. It can thus be seen that a misrepresentation that conceals the existence of significant exculpatory evidence,
even absent fraudulent intent, can be violative of due process, damaging enough
to outweigh considerations of diligence on the part of defense counsel."
In United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkens," the prosecutor withheld the
fact that there were two eyewitnesses who would state, positively, that the
accused was not involved in the alleged crime. Although the court admitted
that the availability of witnesses to the defense, through its own investigations,
is a relevant consideration, availability was not determinative in this case since
defense counsel had only one week to prepare his case. The court, in Wilkens,
understood it as settled law that a characterization of the prosecutor's conduct
was not a necessary precondition to granting relief." In Barbee v. Warden, 9
the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to kill. Three witnesses
identified the accused and tentatively identified, as the assault weapon, a pistol,
which was not entered into evidence. Unknown to the prosecutor, 0 there was
a ballistics report showing that the pistol was not wanted for any known crime.
The court found a violation of due process in Barbee, but the exact reason is
not clear.
Present in all these cases is the dilution of the fraud rationale to the point
of nonexistence. Stress is now laid upon the prejudice generated to the defendant's disadvantage. Courts make extensive inquiries to determine if the suppressed evidence would have helped the defendant. Smallwood v. Warden'
is typical of this approach. There the court stated, "motive is immaterial if the
evidence was vital, i.e. was likely to have affected the result of the trial.122
Brady v. Maryland" provides final confirmation. The Supreme Court stated:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evi16 It has been suggested that Baldi and Dye may be regarded as anomalous due to their
highly compelling fact situations. Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 60 COLUr. L. Rv. 858, 860 (1960).

17

326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).

18 "Formulation of the duty in terms of wilful or wrongful conduct would seem only
to confuse here, and is not necessary under the governing law as we understand it." Id. at
139.
19 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
20 "Indeed, -there is nothing to indicate that this official had been told by the police
of the existence of the reports." Id. at 844.
21 205 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md. 1962).

22 Id. at 329.
23 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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dence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.14 (Emphasis added.)
Through the years, courts have continued to base their decisions in these
cases on broad constitutional grounds- violation of due process. Exactly what
is it that gives prejudice its peculiar flavor and constitutional dimension? It has
been suggested that, in varying degrees, the criminal defendant's inadequate
facilities to obtain facts necessary for a fair trial is the element which gives prejudice its constitutional dimension.25 As one court recently stated:
The average accused usually does not have the manpower or resources
available to the state in its investigation of crime. Nor does he have access
to all the evidence . . . . I do not think it imposes too onerous a burden
on the state to require it to disclose the existence of a witness ... of ...

significance ....

22

The problem posed by Levin, then, directly considered, is one of criminal
discovery, which has been dealt with by expanding the prosecutor's duty of disclosure.21 It is important to note, however, that the prosecutor's duty of disclosure and criminal discovery are not equally efficacious means for achieving
the same end - at least in the federal system. Judicial expansion of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure has been employed as a backhanded technique for extending criminal discovery. Levin is perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon, for it is doubtful that a criminal discovery theory would have called for
the same result.28
An analysis of Mooney's progeny brings to light a complex of three factors
which intermingle with frivolous delight. Where the prosecutors conduct is
virtually fraudulent, courts are oblivious to other considerations. The resulting
prejudice might be the subject of expatiation in order to dramatize the horror
24 Id. at 87.
25 Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty To Reveal Evidence to the Defendant,
74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-43 (1964).
26 Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
27 "I . . . would not cast in constitutional form a broad rule of criminal discovery."
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 92 (1963) (dissent); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228, 242 (1964).
28 On the facts of Levin, FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) would be controlling. See generally
Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 312
(1957). In essence, Rule 17(c) is a codification of the federal courts' power to issue subpoenas duces tecum. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 _(1951), interpreted
Rule 17(e) to permit discovery only if it would facilitate a good faith effort to gather evidence. Discovery is usually barred when an item is not "directly admissible at the instance
of the moving party .... ." Traynor, supra note 27, at 235. To make the picture bleak
beyond hope, there is authority to the effect that Rule 17(c) is not directed at discovery,
but rather at expediting complicated trials. United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C.
1954). The only other source of criminal discovery which could be operative in Levin, the
inherent power of the federal courts to grant discovery rights, also presents a dim picture.
"It is not without significance that since the Jencks case [Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957)] the federal courts have been reluctant to exercise their inherent powers to permit
discovery." Traynor, supra note 27, at 240. Now "the federal courts allow discovery only in
isolated cases, and even then only when the moving party is able to particularize a need or
interest." Traynor, supra note 27, at 230. Interestingly enough, Levin's attorney did make
a pretrial motion to inspect the checks, records, and correspondence in the government's
possession. The motion was denied, and this denial was not attacked on direct appeal. Brief
for Appellee, p. 15, n. 22.
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of the fraud."9 Otherwise, it is not conspicuous in granting relief."0 Defense
counsel's ineffective assistance is no bar to relief.3" Absent fraudulent conduct
by the prosecutor, prejudice and availability of the evidence to the accused are
the key considerations. If prejudice is shown and the defense has been diligent,
relief is granted. Thus, convictions have been overturned where the prosecutor
made misleading statements before the court, 2 where the defense did not have
adequate time to prepare for trial, 3 and where the information was in the state's
control.3 4 In a case where nondisclosed evidence, if known to the accused, would
have been of great significance, regardless of defense counsel's lack of diligence,
the prosecutor's failure to inform defense counsel of this evidence amounted to
a denial of due process.3" However, when the prosecutor's conduct is above
reproach and the nondisclosed evidence is equally available to the defense, relief
is usually denied. 6 Levin appears to be the first case granting relief where the
prosecutor's conduct was so unquestionable, the defense counsel's lack of diligence so extreme, and the evidence's prejudicial effect so dubious. In short,
Levin is unprecedented.
Levin treated three issues: the standard the evidence must meet, the type
of the conduct the prosecuting attorney must display, and the degree of diligence
the defense counsel must show. On the standard of evidence issue, Kyle v.
United States37 held that the required showing of prejudice varies inversely to
the degree to which the conduct of the trial has violated fundamental notions
of fairness.3 " Absent unfair conduct, it would have to be shown that the evidence would probably produce a different verdict. 9 Instead of attempting to
deal with Kyle, Chief Judge Bazelon, in Levin, discussed a standard laid down
by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. United States.0 Bazelon concluded that
"evidence which .. .might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt
". would entitle petitioner to relief. Why this standard, which bears no
apparent relation to the standards laid down in Kyle or Griffin, was chosen is
not revealed.
On the issue of the prosecutor's conduct, Levin held that the prosecutor's
failure to disclose evidence which might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable
29 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
30 People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
31 In United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949),
defendant's attorney was submissive to threats of intimidation and refused to call in any

witnesses to testify on defendant's behalf.

32 United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955).
33 United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkens, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
34 Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
35 Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963). Contra,
State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 941 (1966).
36 E.g., United States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944
(1962); Jordan v. Bondy, 114 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1940).

37

297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).

38 Id. at 514.
39 Ibid. See generally Note, supra note 16, at 865; Note, supra note 24, at 138-42.
40 336 U.S. 704 (1949). The lower court was to grant relief if it were "too dogmatic,
on the basis of mere speculation, for any court to conclude that the jury would not have
attached significance to the evidence favorable to the defendant had the evidence been
before it." (Emphasis added.) Griffin v. United States, supra at 709.
41 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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doubt about appellant's guilt is to be "classified as negligence."' Chief Judge
Bazelon employed a definition of negligence which stressed the result of the
prosecutor's failure to disclose. The standard and accepted definition of negligence," however, characterizes the act and not its result. What was done in
Levin, in a rather subtle fashion, was to eliminate the requirement of showing
negligence on the prosecutor's part. It is submitted that if words are to have
any precision, they cannot be stuffed with new and unrelated meanings. A
word "is the skin of a living thought." 4 It is not a fit subject for legal taxidermy.
Levin is cryptic on the issue of defense counsel's diligence. Noting that
ordinarily a lack of due diligence will bar relief when a motion is based solely
upon discovery of evidence, the court stated that Levin's claim for relief was
based upon a breach of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure, which challenged
the validity of the proceedings, and therefore the diligence of defense counsel
was not a proper consideration in determining the fairness of those proceedings."
By way of qualification, Levin stated that if "appellant's counsel actually knew
the facts withheld, appellant [could not] . . . seek relief on the basis of the
government's failure to disclose these . . . facts."4 By way of amelioration, the
court added that the government was under no duty to search for evidence
favorable to the accused, nor "disclose all its evidence, however insignificant,
to the defense." 7
Judge Burger's dissent in Levin concentrated primarily on the issue of diligence. Judge Burger was at pains to demonstrate that diligence was determinative in assaying the validity of the proceedings in question. He discussed the
advantages already enjoyed by criminal defendants" and proffered several arguments of consequence in criticism of the majority opinion. Burger surmised that
the majority holding would encourage slovenly preparation, put another crack
in the concept of judicial finality, and place upon the prosecution the impossible
42

Ibid.

43

PROSSER, ToRTs

148 (3d ed. 1964).

44 Towne v.Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)

45

46
47
48

(Holmes,J.).

Ordinarily, a finding of lack of due diligence will defeat a motion for a new trial
based only upon the significance of newly discovered evidence. But appellant's
claim for relief based upon a breach of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure challenges the fairness, and therefore the validity, of the proceedings, and relief, either
on a motion for a new trial or for habeas corpus, may not depend on whether more
able, diligent or fortunate counsel might possibly have come upon the evidence on
his own. A criminal trial is not a game of wits between opposing counsel, the
cleverer party, or the one with the greater resources, to be the "winner." Levin
v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Ibid., n. 11.
Id. at 291.
As was stated in United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L.

Hand, J.) :
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted where there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see.
But see People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956). See generally Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149
(1960).
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burden of determining what a witness has revealed to the other side. 9 This
otherwise well-reasoned dissent is marred, however, by a major flaw. Judge
Burger believed that the majority's decision will "tend to allow a second trial
to any defendant imaginative enough to dream up a new theory of defense
as 'newly discovered' because neither party elected to use it at trial. ' 5 (Emphasis
added.) To elect, however, one must choose between known alternatives. The
majority opinion explicitly holds that such a situation would bar relief.51
Levin does not, by its terms, require the prosecutor to make complete disclosure. It is submitted, however, that the rule announced in Levin is designed
to make complete disclosure a practical necessity. The determination as to
whether nondisclosed evidence might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable
doubt about defendant's guilt is not to be made until after trial. To forecast
beforehand the conduct of the trial to take place and to determine with any
degree of precision what effect any given piece of evidence "might have had"
on the jury, requires powers which would have stirred the jealousy of the Pythia.
A decision by the prosecutor not to disclose a piece of evidence also becomes a
precarious affair. The prosecutor is placed under the imminent threat of reversal
should his judgment prove erroneous. Prosecutors must, therefore, either take
an excessive risk in not disclosing certain matters or else disclose all information
in their possession. Wisdom would demand adherence to the latter course.
Moreover, this result is reached by expanding the prosecutor's duty of disclosure,
which is unconditioned by any request from the defense.52 This result not only
inters the requirement that the defense make a showing of need, but permits
what would otherwise be discovery of discovery.
What is most curious about Levin is that the reason given by the majority
to justify its result is equally applicable to the view urged in the dissent.5" Chief
Judge Bazelon's major premise is inarticulate. It is submitted that the only
rationale which can hope to account for the result reached in Levin is that
expounded by the California Supreme Court in People v. Riser."4
Absent some governmental requirement that the information be kept
confidential for the purpose of effective law enforcement, the state has
no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light
on issues in the case.... 5
Analytically, the Riser rationale has a double aspect. On the one hand,
there is the notion that an accused should not be denied access to any relevant
information. This notion is characteristic of a view aimed at furthering and
49 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 296 (D.C.Cir. 1966).
50 Id. at 292.
51 See note 46 supra.
52 This result was not unforeseen. "It will be noticed that the Supreme Court's statement [in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] still requires . . .a demand or request for
the pertinent item .... In all likelihood, the 'Court will soon begin to erode... [this] require-

ment and dispense with the demand ... ' Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112

U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 11 (1963).
53 "[P]recisely because a trial isnot to be a 'game of wits', the law has always required
a showing of due diligence as the precondition to gaining a new trial." Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 292 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
54 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
55 Id. at 586, 305 P.2d at 13.
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assuring the integrity of the criminal process. On the other hand, there is an
outside policy limitation placed upon the accessibility of evidence which springs
from governmental requirements. Because criminal law has more than one
aspect, it gives rise to competing values which impinge upon one another and
demand recognition. If this recognition is not forthcoming, if one value is allowed
to smother the other in the struggle for recognition, criminal law will become
an ineffective tool in ordering the relations among men. Unfortunately, Levin
does not provide that a prosecutor may, upon a proper showing, refuse to disclose relevant information without violating his duty of disclosure.
Even if this defect is ignored, the merits of Levin are still open to question.
California, which has supplied the rationale which best accounts for the Levin
result, has not implemented its full logic, but has been considerably more demure.5 6
Absent any outside policy limitation that a piece of evidence remain undisclosed,
a criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to its production. Logic,
seemingly, must wait upon experience. Apparently, Judge Bazelon recognized
that there is something to be said for restraint when he stated "we do not suggest that the government is required to... disclose all its evidence. .

.,"" In

view of the result which Levin will produce, this qualification is either an oversight or an impious requiem.
The main criticism which Levin must bear is that it is grounded on a broad
constitutional base - violation of due process. The difference between discovery rights and a constitutional duty of disclosure is fundamental. The prosecutor's duty of disclosure does not create a correlative right in the criminal
accused to discovery. Rather, it gives the criminal accused a right to reversal
in a habeas corpus proceeding. This constitutional duty of disclosure also precludes the fashioning of any pretrial remedy. Not only does the concept of
judicial finality suffer an appreciable loss of meaning, but courts are compelled
to engage in a highly speculative inquiry into what the jury might have done.
Further, the issues in these cases may easily assume distorted proportions when
viewed through the medium of due process. There is also a real temptation
to come perilously close to the rule of men and not law.59 Even a cursory glance
at these cases will show that the concept of due process has become an instrument of judicial activism. One might wonder if the problem would not be
more appropriately left to the rule-making power exercised under the legislative
56 "No case has gone so far as to state that the denial of a motion for pretrial inspection
in an abuse of discretion without a showing before the trial court as to why the material is
needed." Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 341 P.2d 743, 746 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1959). Accord, People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964 (1960). See generally Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961).
57 Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
58 "In sum, while the government has an important duty to conduct criminal prosecutions fairly, its obligations must be examined and tested after trial, not before." United States
v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
59 It is clear that theoretically due process is objective in content. "The vague contours
of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We may not draw on our merely
personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952). One may sometimes wonder if
such theoretical purity has been carried over into practice. "It has become increasingly
apparent in these habeas corpus cases that the judicial concept of due process, like beauty,
'is in the eye of the beholder.'" United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622, 629
(3d Cir. 1963) (dissent).
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eye. Even if the matter is best left solely to judicial cognizance, it is submitted
that the present need is not for implementation of an across-the-board disclosure
rationale. Rather, there is a need for moderately detailed rules which will work
out the limits of discovery rights by taking into view the complexity of the
situation and the competing values inherent in the problem. There is a need
for a set of rules which will work with a tolerable degree of precision and
facility. It is further submitted that the concept, of due process is too cumbersome a tool for a work of such delicacy. It follows, then, that if the constitutional duty of disclosure is inadequate to accomplish the task, the problem can
no longer be cast in terms of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure, but must be
considered, directly, as one of criminal discovery rights.
John A. Burgess
FEDERAL PROCEDURE

-

SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A NONDOMICILIARY IN A

FEDERAL TAX CASE SUSTAINED UNDER A STATE "LoNG-ARm"

STATUTE THOUGH

THE' REQUISITE JURISDICTIONAL TRANSACTION OF BuSINESS WAS ESTABLISHED

BY LESS THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. -

Isidor

Klein, managing

director of a Canadian distillery, used his corporate position to force two United
States distributing agents to pay "commissions" to friends and relatives who had
done essentially nothing to earn them. One of the distributing agents was a
New York corporation which made the required "commission" payments through
checks drawn on a New York bank. The other was a San Francisco liquor distributor who, as a precondition to a distributorship, signed a contract in New
York to share two-thirds of his profits with Klein's brother-in-la'v, a New York
resident. The United States government brought an action to recover $9,862,053.34 in income taxes, interest, and penalties on the theory that these "commissions" were properly the income of Klein under the attribution of income
rules of Helvering v. Horst.' Under the New York "long-arm" statute,' personal service of process was made on Klein's executor, Montreal Trust Co., in
Canada. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York accepted Montreal Trust's contention that the court did not have jurisdiction on the ground that Klein had not "transacted business" in New York
within the meaning of the New York statute. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in reversing, held: the facts as found by the
district court demonstrate that New York had sufficient contacts with the transactions which are the subject matter of this case to justify asserting jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for trial on the
merits. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).

1 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
2 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw & RULES § 302 provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor
or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated

in this section, in; the same manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in
person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state ....
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e) and 4(f)' make the procedure for
federal service of process coterminous with the applicable state procedure. These
rules allow a party not an inhabitant of a state or found therein to be served
with a summons in a federal court in the same manner and under the same
circumstances prescribed by the state statute.'
Ever since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,' it has been well settled that a state may take in personam
jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, if he has "certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' , The rule announced in InternationalShoe
3

FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides
for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court
is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner
of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of
the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons,
or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear
and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or
similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or
rule.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a
statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state ...
4 United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965). The Supreme Court
citation for this proposition was the preliminary opinion by Judge McLean, in United States
v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), that the amended rules of Federal
Civil Procedure would allow personal jurisdiction over Montreal if the requisites of the New
York "long-arm" statute were met.
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6 Id. at 316. State power to assert personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries has been
slowly increased by broader interpretations of the due process clause. This extension has
been necessitated by vastly increased interstate commerce, travel, and communication. The
leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), held that jurisdiction over the person
is solely derived from the state's power over such person due to his physical presence within
the state. Since all states are of equal dignity, the independence of one implies the exclusion
of power from all others. The result was that states could assert personal jurisdiction only
upon those persons found within their own borders. Foreign corporations "doing business"
within a state's boundaries were still held amenable to service of process on the theory that
since a state had power to exclude them from carrying on business within the state, the
corporations impliedly consented to in personam jurisdiction by doing such business within
the state's boundaries. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919), said that the "doing business" test could not be applied to individuals because a state may not exclude nonresident
individuals. Thus, the transaction of business by such persons could not be the basis for
implying consent to be bound by the process of the state's courts. With the same type of
reasoning, a nonresident motor vehicle statute was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927). In Hess, it was held that since a state had a paramount interest in regulating its
highways, it could exclude a nonresident until he appointed an agent to receive process.
Thus, the statute saying that use of the highways was implied consent to have a state official
act as agent to receive process was held to be constitutional. Some years later, the Supreme
Court held that regulation of the securities business was so fit for state control that a law
providing for personal service of process upon the agent of a nonresident transacting a securities business was valid. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). Finally, in 1945, the
Supreme Court, in International Shoe, allowed complete personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries so long as such persons have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The decision was based on the reasoning that a nonresident, having received
the benefits of a state's laws, must submit to the obligations under them. McGee v. Interna-
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clearly authorizes extraterritorial service of process when a state statute allows
such service. This rule, although it creates a new dispensation for states, still
leaves it to the states to determine by statute the persons over whom they wish
to assert jurisdiction. Thus, InternationalShoe is best viewed as an enabling act,
and statutory authority is still necessary. Section 302 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules is a "long-arm" statute passed to take advantage of
this new jurisdictional enclave created by InternationalShoe and its companion
7
cases.

The issue presented by Montreal Trust was whether the activities of Klein
amounted to a transaction of business within the meaning of the New York
"ong-arm" statute. In a sense, however, this is only half the problem. In all
such cases where there is an attempt to impose in personam jurisdiction upon a
nondomiciliary, validity of service depends on the satisfaction of two criteria.
First, the act upon which service is predicated must be one which the state
statute contemplates as a basis for such service. Secondly, the nonresident defendant must have such minimum contacts with the state that in personam service
made upon him outside the forum state does not violate due process.'
The majority in Montreal Trust found that Klein's activities, based on
the allegations and facts before the district court, were outside his role as a
corporate officer and that in securing the payment of "commissions" to friends
and relatives he transacted business in New York. This ruling was based upon
a finding that the two United States distributors became Klein's personal agents
in paying the "commissions" and that through these payments there was the
necessary transaction of business within the meaning of the New York statute.
In vigorous disagreement, Judge Timbers took issue with the majority's
finding that there was a personal agency present. He concluded that the requirements of section 302 were not met and thus the assertion of jurisdiction under
it was unconstitutional as applied to the Montreal Trust Co.9 Anyone familiar
with the record would have to agree that the existence of such a personal agency
is at most tenuous under the facts shown.
The court's detailed inquiry into the agency question obscures the real
problem in Montreal Trust. Considering the weakness of this agency straw, one
wonders on what basis jurisdiction was sustained. The problem posed by Montreal Trust is germane to many cases where jurisdiction is seriously questioned.
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), further expanded and clarified International Shoe
by showing that even a single contact with the forum state can be enough to allow it to assert
in personam jurisdiction. However, Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), shows that
Pennoyer is not yet dead. Hanson held that for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident, he must have purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state.
For a detailed discussion of this development of in personam jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries in relation to the due process clause see: 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 1
4.25[3], [4], [5]; 1114.41-1[1], [3] (2d ed. 1962). See generally Cleary & Seder, Extended
jurisdictional Basis for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599 (1955); Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L. F.
533; O'Conner & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The
Illinois Revised Practice Act, 31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 223 (1956).
7 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209
N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
8 2 Moore, op. cit. supra note 6, 1 4.41-1[3], at 1291.51.
9 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242-43 (2d Cir.) (separate
opinion), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[December 1966]

Courts often encounter difficulty in trying to differentiate between jurisdictional
issues and issues on the merits.
Counsel for the government argued that in a suit for back taxes, the jurisdictional question of a transaction of business is "inextricably related" to the
substantive issue of tax liability.' In essence, this argument is that since a transaction is necessary to obtain income on which tax might be owing, it is obvious
that if there were a tax liability, there would necessarily have to have been a
transaction upon which jurisdiction could be based. Thus, a determination of
one necessarily involves a determination of the other.
In presenting this argument that the substantive issue and the jurisdictional
issue were inextricably related, the government attempted to convince the Second
Circuit that the district court had erroneously decided the jurisdictional issue
since such a decision necessarily involved a decision on the merits." However,
the Second Circuit initially refused to accept this argument for two reasons.
First, the government had failed to raise this contention in the district court. In
fact, this was a reversal of position for them. Thus, according to the rule that
appellate courts will not ordinarily consider points not raised in the district
court, this argument could not be determinative.' Second, despite the argument
that a transaction is necessary to incur tax liability, so that if there is tax owing
there had to have been a transaction, the facts in Montreal Trust can be distinguished from the landmark cases where jurisdictional and substantive issues
were so closely related that a trial of the merits was required.13
The Second Circuit has a practice of settling jurisdictional disputes through
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 9, United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.),
aert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
It is clear, therefore, that the court could only have decided that there was no
jurisdiction under Section 302 by deciding that the transactions described did not
produce income taxable to Klein. Since the issue of the taxability to Klein of the
income arising from these transactions is the very issue on the merits, there is no
escape from the conclusion that jurisdiction and merits are, in this case, inextricably
related. Ibid.
11 Reply Brief for Appellant, p. 5.
12 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 247 n.4 (2d Cir.) (separate
opinion), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
13 In Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947), the question was whether the United States
Maritime Commission wrongfully retained stocks delivered by a corporation or whether the
stocks were held by the United States itself. The United States had not consented to suit
and was thus immune from district court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that the
case had to be tried on the merits because the only method of determining if there was
jurisdiction was to answer the principal question of whether the United States or the Maritime Commission held the stocks. In Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632 (1907), plaintiff
alleged and defendants denied that the defendants jointly took and held his whole lot of
land. The district court found that the defendants had not jointly taken the whole lot of
land. This finding denied jurisdiction and, in effect, decided the controversy between the
parties on the merits, but without the benefit of trial. The Supreme Court reversed saying
the merits could not be decided while determining the existence of jurisdiction. The distinguishing element in Montreal Trust was that proof of the allegations in the complaint would
establish only that Klein owed some taxes and would not, without further proof or assumptions, establish absolute jurisdictional necessity of a transaction of business in New York,
though such might logically follow. The point is that it is possible to receive income without
ever transacting business, and it is the transaction alone that gives jurisdiction under § 302.
In other words, despite the government's argument, there is a necessity of proving that Klein
individually transacted business in New York, either personally or through agents. This can
be done without showing his tax liability and a determination by the trial judge would not
amount to any decision on taxability, or for that matter, whether any transaction created
income.
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further hearings on the relevant facts in the district court."' In Montreal Trust,
however, there had been a full hearing and determination by the district court
that the jurisdictional facts had not been proven. Logically, though, it still
followed that if the government could prove the merits of its tax claim, in all
probability, the necessary jurisdictional transactions would appear as well.
Therefore, according to the majority:
The District Court, in dealing with this issue at the preliminary hear-'
ing, we believe, placed a too heavy burden on the government in requiring
it to establish a strong factual basis upon which jurisdiction is predicated
in this case. At this early stage of the proceedings, the government should
not have been required to submit proof which would, in effect establish
the validity of its claim and its right to the relief sought. Rather, to bring
§ 302 into operation, and thereby invoke the jurisdiction of the District
Court, the government was required to establish only prima facie taxrelated transactionsof Klein in New York. We must, therefore, determine
whether on the allegations and facts before Judge McLean, Klein was
transacting sufficient business within New York so as to bring him within
reach of the "long-arm" statute and require a trial on the merits. (Emphasis added.)
The effect of this holding is to allow imposition of personal jurisdiction
under the New York "long-arn" statute with much less than a preponderance
of the evidence being needed to establish the requisite jurisdictional facts. Such
a result is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in McNutt v.
GeneralMotors Acceptance Corp." In McNutt, it was held that:
In the nature of things, the authorized inquiry is primarily directed to the
one who claims that the power of the court should be exerted in his behalf.
As he is seeking relief . . . it follows that he must carry throughout the
litigation the burden of showing that he is properly in court. The authority
which the statute [28 U.S.C. § 80, now 28 U.S.C. §§ 1359, 1447, 1919
(1964)] vests in the court to enforce the limitations of its jurisdiction
precludes the idea that jurisdiction may be maintained by mere averment or that the party asserting jurisdiction may be relieved of his burden by any formal procedure. If his allegations of jurisdictional facts
are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support
them by competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court
may still insist that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be
dismissed, and for that purpose the court may demand that the party
alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.17
The majority made a feeble effort to stay within the McNutt rule by stating in
a footnote:
Our conclusion that the government established at least threshold jurisdiction at the preliminary hearing does not relieve it at the trial of the case14 Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965); Gelfand v.
Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
15 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966).
16 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
17 Id. at 189.
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in-chief from proving the facts upon which jurisdiction is based by a preporiderance of the evidence.' s
It is submitted that establishment of "threshold jurisdiction" through the
presentation of the so-called "prima facie tax-related transactions" satisfies
neither the language nor the purpose of McNutt. Despite the Second Circuit's
subtle sidestep of requiring a preponderance of evidence in the trial on the merits,
it remains obvious that Montreal challenged jurisdiction in an appropriate manner. 9 Nevertheless, the case was allowed to go to trial without jurisdiction being
established by a preponderance of the evidence. This result is in direct conflict
with McNutt and a long series of companion cases which have held that whenever the defendant questions jurisdiction in an appropriate manner, plaintiff
has the burden of establishing the requisite jurisdictional facts by a preponderance
of-the evidence."0
. The Second Circuit in Montreal Trust fell for the government's contention
that if they are permitted to prove tax liability, jurisdictional transactions are
bound to appear. The court accepted the allegation that Klein obtained constructive income by having the "commissions" paid. On this basis, the payments were viewed as "prima facie tax-related transactions" by assumed agents
capable of satisfying the requirements of the New York "long-arm" statute.
The effect of the Montreal Trust decision is to create a hiatus between the
procedtral method of asserting in personam jurisdiction in the state and that
in the federal courts - at least in relation to federal tax claims. In New York
and Illinois,2 and indeed in the Second Circuit itself, it has long been the practice when there has been an initial motion questioning validity of service to
determine jurisdictional issues under the "long-arm" statutes prior to a trial on
the merits. 22 In making this determination, at least one court has required that
the person invoking the jurisdiction of the court under a "long-arm" statute
hs the burden of proving the essential jurisdictional facts. 3
Now, in the Second Circuit, the establishment of "prima facie tax-related
18 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966).
19 By motion to set aside the service and to dismiss the action. United States v. Montreal
Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 345, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
20 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d
842 (2d Cir. 1965); Anderson v. Stoffle, 339 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1964); Yoder v. Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation, 339 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964); Industrial
Electronics Corp. v. Cline, 330 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1964); Birmingham Post Co. v. Brown,
217 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1954); Town of Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1939);
Magnaflux Corp. v. Foerster, 223 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (based on the Illinois
"long-arm" statute); Shaffer v. Coty, 183 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 108 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21 The Illinois "long-arm" statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956),
is very similar to New York's. In fact, § 302 was modeled after the Illinois act. LonginesWittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d
8 (1965).
22 Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1965); Gelfand v.
Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F. 2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Magnaflux Corp. v. Foerster, 223 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill.
1,963); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Kramer v. Vogl, 17
N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co.
v. Barnes Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
23 Magnaflux Corp. v. Foerster, 223 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Ill. 1963). A reading of the
cases cited at note 22 supra suggests that this is the general rule.
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transactions" based on the allegations and facts of a particular case will be enough
to invoke New York's "long-arm" statute and force a defendant into a trial on
the merits. Such a ruling forces a nondomiciliary to make a- costly defense in
a foreign jurisdiction even though the plaintiff has been unable to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that such a court has jurisdiction. According to
Judge Timbers, when the facts are as sketchy as they were in Montreal Trust,
section 302 is rendered unconstitutional as applied. Timbers felt that requiring
a trial on the merits under such circumstances violates the traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice required by International Shoe. As he so
aptly stated:
I regret that my colleagues on the majority .. .by today's decision
are departing from the historic role of our Court in not furnishing the
sound guidance, based on the unmistakably clear state substantive law here
controlling, so sorely needed in defining the proper scope of constitutional
assertion of -personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in a federal tax
case. The issue is one of first impression. It is vital to the sound administration of the revenue laws of the United States. And its radiations, for
good or bad, will surely permeate interpretations by other courts of state
long arm statutes
throughout the land. I wish I could believe its radiations
24
were gooCL
It would be difficult to disagree. The "long-arn" statutes evidently make
hard cases when applied in the tax field. Here the application may have also
made bad law.

John E. Amerman
PROBATE

JURISDICTION

IN

WRONGFUL

DEATH

ACTION

-

SETTLEMENT

OBTAINED BY STATUTORY TRUSTEE'S FRAUD Is NOT RES JUDICATA AS TO
PARTY WHOSE CLAIM WAS NOT PRESENTED.- On April 12, 1956, Willard

Milliman left his wife, Clarabelle, and their six children at home in New York
and departed for work. His family never saw or heard from him again. That
summer Willard turned up in Arizona. Without ever obtaining a divorce from
Clarabelle, Milliman remarried in Arizona. When this marriage ended in
divorce, Milliman traveled to New Mexico where he met and married Lucy
Mae Horn in 1960. At the time of this marriage, Lucy Mae was the mother
of an illegitimate child. Milliman and Lucy Mae subsequently had a child of
their own. As of March 1, 1961, Willard Milliman was the legal husband of
Clarabelle, in New York, and was living as husband to Lucy Mae and father
to her two children. The next day Willard was killed in an automobile accident
on an Arizona highway. Lucy Mae petitioned the probate court for letters of
administration. Upon her appointment as administratrix, she petitioned for
authorization to compromise and settle the wrongful death claim arising out
of Willard's death. At the time of this petition, Lucy Mae knew about Willard's
legal wife in New York but told neither the court nor the insurance company.
The compromise petition was approved, and in compliance with the court's
24 United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 259 (2d Cir.) (separate opinion),

cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966).
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order, the Farmers Insurance Company paid Lucy Mae $50,000, "individually
and as administratrix." Lucy Mae appropriated $33,333.33 of this sum to herself; the remainder was placed in a trust fund for the two minor children. After
Lucy Mae had squandered the entire amount, Clarabelle arrived from New
York and sought to revoke Lucy's letters of administration. An administrator

de bonus non, appointed on behalf of Clarabelle, petitioned the probate court
to set aside its order approving the compromise and settlement of the wrongful
death claim. When the trial court did so, Farmers Insurance (the real party
in interest) took an appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals which affirmed the
lower court's decision.1 This opinion was modified on rehearing.2 An appeal
from these decisions was taken by the Farmers Insurance Group. In a unanimous
opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed and held: a settlement of a wrongful death claim made on petition of a person in her individual capacity and as
administratrix, who fraudulently concealed from the court a legal survivor, is
not res judicata as to the legal widow and surviving children when the petition
was acted on by the probate court without notice to the legal widow and children. In re Milliman, 415 P.2d 877 (Ariz. 1966).
The two critical questions that the court faced in Milliman concerned the
probate court's jurisdiction over settlement of a wrongful death claim and the
authority of a personal representative to compromise a claim where there are

survivors.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Milliman distinguished between two types
of wrongful death legislation.' Under one type of statute, the cause of action
vests in the estate of the deceased. The statute in force in Arizona prior to 1956
was of this type The other type wrongful death act vests the cause of action
in the individual beneficiaries named in the statute. Milliman was decided under
the Arizona Wrongful Death Act, as enacted in 1956. Under this statute, the
cause of action arises on behalf of the individual beneficiaries named in the
statute' and not on behalf of the estate, as was the case under the former act.
I In re Milliman, 2 Ariz. App. 155, 406 P.2d 873 (1965).
2 In re Milliman, 2 Ariz. App. 338, 409 P.2d 54 (1965), aff'd, 415 P.2d 877 (1966).
3 Care must be taken to distinguish wrongful death acts from survival statutes. Survival
statutes continue a cause of action which arose before the decedent's death. Such statutes
traditionally vest the cause in the estate of the deceased. Wrongful death acts, on the other
hand, are derived from Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, and create a new
cause of action in favor of those named in the particular statute. The act may create the
cause in favor of the estate, but it need not. For a good discussion of those designated to
sue on a wrongful death claim, see SPEIsER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 11:17
(1966).
4 Arizona Wrongful Death Statute (April 19, 1901) (repealed), ARIz. REv. STAT. § 2765
(1901), provided:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of personal representative
of such deceased person; and, provided, that the father, or in the case of his death
or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain the action for the death of a
child, and the guardian for the death of his ward; and the amount recovered in
every such action shall be distributed to the parties and in the proportions provided
by law in relation to the distribution of personal estate left by persons dying
intestate.
5 AIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-612(A) (1956) provides:
An action for wrongful death shall be brought by and in the name of the
surviving husband or wife or personal representative of the deceased person for and
on behalf of the surviving husband or wife, children or parents, or if none of
these survive, on behalf of the decedent's estate.
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Since the wrongful death claim in Milliman was not an asset of the decedent's
estate, the probate court had no jurisdiction to grant a court order approving
the settlement.6 Thus, the order in Milliman was issued without jurisdiction
and was void from the beginning. Such an order could not be res judicata in
regard to undisclosed legal survivors.
Letters of administration, however, do authorize the holder to act as personal representative of the deceased. Since Lucy Mae had such letters, she was
entitled to bring an action for wrongful death.' However, as the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out, the personal representative acts in this capacity only
as a statutory trustee for the benefit of the named beneficiaries.' Such a trustee
cannot settle a claim on behalf of the beneficiaries unless he obtains their consent; or unless the settlement money is paid to those found by the probate court
to be heirs entitled to such money under the same proceeding as provided for
in the distribution of the estate. By this reasoning, Lucy Mae could not have
acted as trustee for the absent beneficiaries. Consequently, when Lucy Mae
settled with the insurance company, "individually and as, administratrix," she
was compromising the claim in her individual capacity only. In so doing, Lucy
Mae could not affect the rights of Milliman's legal wife and children. According to this line of reasoning, the insurance company merely paid $50,000 to the
wrong individual, and their mistake did not alter their liability toward the rightful beneficiaries. 9
The question on appeal in Milliman involved the validity of the court
order approving the wrongful death compromise. The opinion, however, went
beyond this narrow point to discuss the validity of the compromise itself. By
interpreting the Arizona Wrongful Death Act as creating the cause of action
in the beneficiaries and not in the estate," the court placed the order approving
the settlement outside the probate court's jurisdiction. 1 A judgment entered
without jurisdiction is void,' 2 and it is within the court's inherent power to
purge its records of void judgments regardless of the statute of limitations
applicable to collateral attacks."3
6 Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 14-474(B) (1956) provides: A compromise of a claim by or
against the estate may be authorized when it appears just and for the best interests of the

estate. (Emphasis added.)
7 Asuz. R1v. STAT. § 12-612(D) (1956):

The term "personal representative" as used in this section shall include any.

person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are granted by competent
authority under the laws of this or any other state. The action for wrongful death
may be maintained by any such personal representative without issuance of further
letters, or other requirement or authorization of law.

8 In re Milliman, 415 P.2d 877, 885 (Ariz. 1966).

9 Id. at 887.
10 Id. at 884.

11 The Arizona Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's excellent analysis of
the effects of the amendments to the wrongful-death statute. The appellate court had stated:
If, as seems to be very clear, a probate proceedings [sic] is one in rem, what
is the thing over which the court has jurisdiction? We -believe it to be no more than
the "estate" of the deceased, and . .. [it] may include less depending upon one's
definition of a decedent's "estate." In re Milliman, 2 Ariz. App. 155, 406 P.2d
873, 878 (1965). Accord, In re Riccomi's Estate, 185 Cal. 458, 197 Pac. 97 (1921); Wright
v. Royse, 43 Ill. App. 2d 267, 193 N.E.2d 340 (1963). See Tidball, Probate jurisdiction in
Wrongful Death Actions, 2 Wyo. L. J. 109 (1948).
12 Rico Consol. Mining Co. v. Rico Exploration Co., 23 Ariz. 389, 204 Pac. 138 (1922).
13 Preston v. Denkins, 94 Ariz. 214, 382 P.2d 686 (1963).
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. The court's invalidation of the order approving the settlement, however,
although it answered the narrow question raised on appeal, did not settle the
real issue of whether or not the settlement itself was res judicata as to the rightful
beneficiaries. In trying to invalidate the settlement itself, the court's reasoning
was a bit more tenuous.
The court in Milliman acknowledged that although the administrator cannot maintain a wrongful death action on behalf of the estate, he is empowered
by the statute to bring the action as personal representative.' As personal representative, the administrator is statutory trustee for the named beneficiaries.'
In Milliman, the order which made Lucy Mae administratrix was never challenged. Since her power as trustee stemmed from the letters of administration,
which she received from the probate court, 6 her standing as trustee had nothing
to do with her marital status or lack of it. Although the order approving the
settlement may have been void for want of jurisdiction, granting letters of
administration is expressly within the probate court's jurisdiction." Thus, the
precise problem in Milliman becomes one of defining the power of a statutory
trustee to settle disputed claims on behalf of statutory beneficiaries. The bestreasoned law on fiduciaries is that a statutory trustee can settle such claims"
without court approval, 9 and even without the consent, and contrary to the
wishes of, the lawful beneficiaries.' °
In American Car & Foundry Co. v. Anderson,2" the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dealt with a Missouri Wrongful Death Statute,
which, like the Arizona act, creates a cause of action in favor of the statutory
beneficiaries rather than the estate. The Eighth Circuit, in discussing the power
of the administrator to settle, stated:
It is quite uniformly held that the administrator or other persons
authorized to bring suit for damages for the death of another may compromise the claim . . . and that such compromises may be made, not only
14 In re Milliman, 415 P.2d 877, 884 (1966). See text accompanying note 7 supra.
15 The California Supreme Court, in Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas & Elec. Co., 164 Cal.
188, 128 Pac. 330 (1912), in speaking about the California Wrongful Death Act, stated:
It is settled by the decisions that an action of the character authorized by
section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is one solely for the benefit of the heirs,
by which they may be compensated for the pecuniary injury suffered by them by
reason of the loss of their relative, that the money recovered in such an action does
not belong to the estate but to the heirs only, and that an administrator has the
right to bring the action only because the statute authorizes him to do so, and that
he is simply made a statutory trustee to recover damages for the benefit of the heirs.
Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas & Elec. Co., supra at 191-92. 128 Pac. at 332. Accord, Bright's
Estate v. Western Air Lines, 104 Cal. App. 2d 827, 232 P.2d 523 (1951). See also Sp-SER,
op. cit. supra note 3, at § 11:20 (1966) ; Tidball, supra note 11, at 110.
16 Aiz. REv. STAT. § 12-612(D) (1956). See text accompanying note 7 supra.
17 Aazz. REv. STAT. § 14-301(A) (1956). See also Tidball, supra note 11, at 109.
18 E.g., Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gipe, 160 Ind. 360, 65 N.E. 1034 (1903);
Bell v. Hankins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958).
19' Pittsburg, C.C. & St. ,L. Ry. v. Gipe, supra note 18; Montgomery v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co.,'71 So. 162 (Miss. 1916).
-20 Mann v. Minnesota Elec. Light & Power Co., 43 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1930); American
Car & Foundry Co. v. Anderson, 211 Fed. 301 (8th Cir. 1914); Manus v. A. E. Sanford Co.,
82 N.J.L. 124, 81 AUt. 491 (1911). Accord, Shaffer, Fiduciary Power To Compromise
Claims, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 528, 534 (1966). But see SpesER, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 11:23
(1966).

21

211 Fed. 301 (8th Cir. 1914).
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where the beneficiaries do not consent, but where they affirmatively object.22
(Emphasis added.)
A settlement made by a legally appointed statutory trustee exhausts the
cause of action unless the third party settlor acts fraudulently. 3 Fraud on the
part of the third party settlor will void the settlement regardless of the statutoiy
trustees power to compromise the claim. However, fraud by the trustee, acting
alone, should not prejudice the rights of a third party, good faith settlor, after
the money has been paid.

4

It is the duty of the trustee, at his peril, to distribute the trust to the proper
beneficiaries 2 If the trustee fails in this duty through fraud or neglect, he and
his bondsman should be held accountable to those damaged by such default.2"
It is submitted that insurance companies, who settle in good faith, should not
have to pay a justly compromised claim a second time. Parties whose real interests are involved should be entitled to the benefits of res judicata.2" Res
judicata is primarily a rule of public policy and is only secondarily for the benefit
of the litigants.2" Wrongful death acts of the type involved in Milliman anticipate
but one cause of action 9 When the insurance company settled in good faith
with the court-appointed trustee, all claims of the beneficiaries arising out of
the accident should have been extinguished.
When Lucy settled "individually and as administratrix," she was acting
in a dual capacity. As an individual, she might have a claim to the proceeds.
As an administratrix, she was empowered by statute to bring the action and
act as statutory trustee for the beneficiaries, whoever they might be. Surely, the
fact that Lucy Mae had no valid claim to the money as an individual should
not invalidate a settlement made by her as trustee.3 0 As trustee, she held the
money for the legal beneficiaries. The fact that the probate bond might be
insufficient to secure the trust, or that an action against the fraudulent trustee
might prove worthless, should not deprive a third party, settling in good faith,
of the benefits of res judicata.
As a result of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Milliman, Arizona
insurance companies dsiring to compromise wrongful death claims are in a
precarious position. According to the Arizona court, insurance companies can
protect themselves in one of two ways. They can either seek diligently to ascertain
the rightful party with whom to settle where a wrongful death statute (as opposed to a survival statute) is involved; 3" or, they can settle with the heirs found
22 Id. at 308.
23 Reed v. Blevins, 222 Ark. 202, 258 S.W.2d 564 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937
(1954) ; Spencer v. Bradley, 351 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1961); Wilson-Harris v. Southwest Tel. Co.,
141 P.2d 986 (Okla. 1943), noted in 92 U. PA. L. Rxv. 323 (1944).
24 See Carr v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 180 Ala. 159, 60 So. 277 (1912).
25 Tidball, supra note 11, at 113.
26 Id. at 109.

27

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 85, comment a (1942).

28 Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1942).
29 Reed v. Blevins, 222 Ark. 202, 258 S.W.2d 564 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937
(1954); Wilson-Harrison v. Southwest Tel. Co., 141 P.2d 986 (Okla. 1943).
30 Williams v. Louisville & N.R.R., 246 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Tenn. 1965): Contra,
Ellenberg v. Arthur, 178 S.C. 490, 183 S.E. 306 (1936).
31 Actions under the survival statutes would theoretically still be actions vesting in the
estate of the deceased and under probate court jurisdiction as to settlements. See text ac-
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by the probate
court, under the same proceeding as provided in the distribution
32
of the estate.
The trouble with the first alternative is that it does not really protect insurance companies. There is no foolproof investigative technique for uncovering
beneficiaries. By following the second suggested alternative, insurance companies
will either have to wait until heirship proceedings are commenced in probate
court or press for such proceedings themselves. They must either assume the
burden of being the moving party or sit idly by until the proceeding runs its
normal course. Even if they do get a determination of legal heirs from the
probate court, they still may not be safe. The probate court's determination
of the heirs may be subject to collateral attack, either because the statutory
notice requirements were not met,3 3 or because the constitutional safeguards of
due process were not observed.34 It would seem that a wrongful death settlement based on such a probate determination would be open to the same attack
as the determination itself.
The effect of the Milliman decision in other states with similar wrongful
death acts3" will depend on whether these states accept the Milliman rule concerning the statutory trustee's power to settle in the face of the trustee's own
fraud. In Arizona, where the problem is more immediate, insurance companies
will have to send detectives into the hills to find all lawful beneficiaries, if they
want to finally settle a wrongful death claim. They will also have to scatter a
few in the probate courts.
Thomas M. Ward
FEDERAL PROCEDURE -

SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FEDERAL GARNISHMENT

(c)AND NOT STATE RULES.
-On July 3, 1962, Theodore Tanos, a use plaintiff, obtained a money judgment
in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. When this
judgment became final, Tanos instituted a garnishment action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, naming St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Company (hereinafter St. Paul) as garnishee. The clerk
of this court drew up a writ of garnishment expressly directed "To THE
PROCEEDINGS MUST COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE 4

UNITED

OF

THE

STATES

STATE

MARSHAL,

OF

AND

FLORIDA."

OR

THE

Thereafter,

SHERIFFS

the

writ

AND

was

CONSTABLES

served,

in

companying note 6 supra. See also'Hamill, Death by Wrongful Act---"Survival" and "Death"
Statutes, 5 Mim. S.B.J. 189 (1926).
32 In re 1Millinian, 415 P.2d 877, 886 (1966).
33 Amiz. Rzv. STAT. § 14-413 (1956). For a good discussion of probate notice requirements, see Stevens v. Torregano, 192 Cal. App. 2d 105, 13 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1961).
34 An heir who is not notified of probate proceedings may have been deprived of due
process, even if the statutory notice requirements of the forum state were fulfilled. Due
process requirements

regarding notice do not depend

upon a distinction between actions

in rem and those in personam. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950).
35
In order to fall under Milliman, the state's wrongful death act must vest the cause
of action in the beneficiaries named in the statute rather than in the decedent's estate. For
a list of the persons designated by statute to bring a wrongful death action, in the several
states, see SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 11:17.
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accordance with Florida law,' upon the State Insurance Commissioner.
This official accepted service on behalf of the garnishee and immediately sent
a copy of the writ by registered mail to the insurance company's president,
together with a statement that the writ had been served upon him by the sheriff.
St. Paul filed a motion to quash service of the writ because it had not been
served by a United States marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(c) After the federal district court sustained its request, St. Paul received
permission from a state court to deposit in that court's registry the full amount
due on the superseded judgment. When a second writ of garnishment was
drawn by the clerk of the federal district court and served by a United States
marshal, St. Paul met this new challenge with a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that it was no longer indebted to the judgment debtor. The district
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Though a strong
dissent was filed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court and held: service of process in a federal district court garnishment proceeding in order to be valid must comply with federal and not state
rules. United States ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins, Co., 361 F.2d 838
(5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3141 (U.S. Oct. 18,
1966) (No. 652).
It is quite obvious that had this case been filed in a Florida state court
and process served by a county sheriff, as done above, the service would have
been proper.' However, by its decision in Tanos, the Fifth Circuit rejected this
state procedure for service of process and required that, if no person is specially
appointed by the court, all process in a federal garnishment proceeding must
be served by a United States marshal.
The majority in Tanos relied on two Tenth Circuit decisions for support:
Rursey v. George E. Failing Co.4 and Mid-Continent Gas. Co. v. Everett.'
The Rumsey case involved a proceeding in garnishment upon a federal court
money judgment. A summons had been duly issued and served upon the
garnishee, Rumsey. This summons required the garnishee to answer whether he
was indebted to the judgment debtor, and whether he had in his possession or
under his control any property belonging to the debtor. Rumsey, as garnishee,
properly filed his sworn answer claining that he was not indebted in any manner
and that he did not have in his possession any such property. The judgment
creditor filed notice to take issue with Rumsey's answer., This answer was served
by mail in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 (b). Kansas law,
however, required service in such a case to be personal. The Tenth Circuit
noted that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) requires that state
practice and procedure control in supplementary proceedings, any statute of the
United States governs to the extent that it is applicable.6 The court held that
.2

1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.0221 (1960).
2 Fn . R. Civ. P. 4(c) provides: "Service of all process shall be made by a United
States marshal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by the court for that
purpose .... "

3 FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.3(c) (1956).
4 333 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1964).
5 340 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1965).
6 FED. R. *itv. P. 69(a) provides in part:
The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a
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service under the federal rule was proper, since the general provisions of state
law did not specifically deal with practice and procedure in supplementary
proceedings. 7 The court in Rumsey also noted that although the federal rules
are not statutes, they have the force and effect of statutes.'
In the Mid-Continent case, the Tenth Circuit again observed that, although

Kansas law required personal service upon the garnishee of election to take issue
with an answer, in federal garnishment proceedings, mailing a copy of election
to the garnishee's attorneys constitutes sufficient service. As authority for this

proposition, the court cited with approval its prior decision in Rumsey'
It is clear that "no authority exists for the service of process in a manner
other than that set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Furthermore,
since the federal rules have statutory effect, it was the duty of the court clerk
to follow such rules in issuing process." However, though it is the clerk's obligation to pursue his duties in accordance with the federal rules, "responsibility
for the service of process is upon the plaintiff . . . and he may not 'pass the
buck' to the Clerk ....
"'
Applying this reasoning to Tanos, it follows that
ultimate responsibility for proper service of process rested on the plaintiff. Therefore, even though the clerk in Tanos expressly directed the writ to a United
States marshal, and/or the sheriffs of Florida, the plaintiff could not complain
of the clerk's error.
A number of cases in both state and federal courts emphasize the necessity
of following the explicit procedure for service of process set forth in that jurisdiction's rules or statutes. In Mendoza v. Acme Transfer & Storage Co."s the
garnishee was served by a person other than a sheriff, contrary to state law.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the writ had to be delivered by the
sheriff. Since the plaintiff failed to comply with this procedure, service was
void, and the lower court was precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the
judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance
with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held,
existing at the time the remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United
States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
7 Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1964).
8 Ibid. Accord, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); John R. Alley & Co. v.
Federal Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942). Professor Moore also points out this
statutory effect of the federal rules. "Rule 69 . . . states 'that any statute of the United
States governs to the extent that it is applicable.' A Federal Rule, which has statutory effect,
will also govern." 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
69.04[2] (2d ed. 1966).
9 Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Everett, 340 F.2d 65, 69 (10th Cir. 1965).
10 Oster v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F. Supp 746, 748 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub noma.,
Clay v. Dominion of Canada, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936
(1957).
11 After stating the first qualification to Federal Rule 64 that "any existing statute
of the United States governs to the extent to which it is applicable," the Sixth Circuit in
Brown v. Beckham, 137 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 803 (1943),
commented:
We think this undoubtedly means that if there is any existing applicable federal
statute that modifies the manner provided by the state in making the remedy of
attachment available, the Clerk of the District 'Court, whose duty it is to issue
all process from that court, is bound thereby.
12 Huffmaster v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 120, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1960). Cf. Messenger
v. United States, 231 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1956).
13 66 N.M. 32, 340 P.2d 1080 (1959). Cf. Williams v. Smith, 169 Ga. 136, 149 S.E. 908
(1929); Thompson v. 'Central Metal & Supply Co., 158 Md. 186, 148 Atl. 231 (1930);
Carroll County Bank v. Goodall, 41 N.H. 81 (1860); Edwards v. Case, 78 Or. 220, 152
Pac. 880'(1915). Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1961).
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garnishee. The Michigan Supreme Court, in Webster v. Bennett,14 likewise held
that only a sheriff or his deputy could properly serve a writ of garnishment.
The United States Supreme Court, prior to the adoption of the federal rules,
rendered an opinion in a related area which lends some support to the holding in
Tanos, Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. City of Clarksdale'5 involved a federal court sup-

plementary proceeding in an execution sale by a United States marshal of defendant city's stock. In reference to the proper procedure to be followed in the
federal system, the Supreme Court stated:
These qualifying words [in REv. STAT. §§ 914, 916 (1875)] recognize the
necessity for some play in adapting the state procedure to the practice of
the federal courts. Certain things must be changed. The officer issuing
the writ of execution must be the United States clerk, the officer executing
it must be the marshal, and not the sheriff . . . .'6 (Emphasis added.)
It should be-noted, however, that since Yazoo was decided before the adoption of the federal rules it cannot be considered binding authority in a case such as
Tanos. Nevertheless, Federal Rule 4(c) explicitly states that process must be

served by a United States marshal or one specially appointed by the federal court.
Therefore, since the process serving sheriff in Tanos was neither a federal marshal
nor one specially appointed by the court, service of process was invalid.
In his dissent in Tanos, Judge Brown argued that it is a mere technicality to
distinguish between a United States marshal and a Florida county sheriff for
purposes of service of process in a federal court garnishment proceeding.'
Judge Brown attempted to distinguish the authority cited by the majority as well
as to offer an explanation as to why process could validly be served by the
sheriff.
Judge Brown accepted the holdings of the two cases relied on by the
majority. However, he qualified the holdings in these cases as applied to the
situation in Tanos. After first pointing out that the problem in Rumsey and
Mid-Continent arose because the garnishee followed the federal rather than the

Kansas rule on service of process, he went on to say:
Although the Court used some language to the effect that the Federal
Rules are controlling, the sole issue it had to decide was whether Kansas
law was controlling. It held only that delivering the answer to the Garnishor
pursuant to Rule 5(b) was permissible. It did not hold that following the
Kansas procedure would be impermissible.3' (Emphasis added.)

Rumsey and Mid-Continent, therefore, merely stand for the proposition that
14

247 Mich. 616, 226 N.W. 684 (1929).

17

Judge Brown stated:
I cannot believe that in the 20th Century in an atmosphere which aims the
Rules at attaining substantial justice . . . it matters whether the person, delivering
the paper to the responsible well-run office of a high state official whose function
is then to buy and lick a United States postage stamp, wears a blue suit rather
than an open-range hat, displays the badge of a marshal rather than the badge
of a sheriff. United States ex re. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d
838, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 844.

15 257 U.S. 10 (1921).
16 Id. at 24.

18
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in a federal court proceeding, if you have acted in accordance with the federal
rules, you have performed properly. Brown believed that these cases did not
answer the question presented in Tanos, viz., whether following state procedure
in a federal court proceeding may be valid.
In his dissent, Judge Brown cited Ospina v. Vanelli,1" which is nearly on
all fours with the relevant facts in Tanos. The plaintiff in Ospina prepared a
garnishment summons, and service was made by someone other than the United
States marshal. As in Tanos, the defendants claimed that under the federal
rules the marshal must serve process in order for service to be valid. The district
court, noting that Minnesota law allows service by any person not a party, rejected the defendants' contention and held the service valid. Although this case
was clearly relevant, the majority's opinion in Tanos made no mention of it whatsoever. Perhaps this omission can be attributed to the fact that Ospina is a district court opinion. Professor Moore notes that district court opinions may have
"little or no precedential value" in this area because of the wide variations in
the nature and detail of the individual state statutes authorizing provisional
remedies.2 However, due to the close factual resemblance between Ospina and
Tanos, the majority, even though they might decline to follow its holding, should
have at least acknowledged Ospina and given reasons for their refusal to follow it.
Judge Brown placed strong emphasis in his dissent on the idea that a mere
technicality, such as requiring process to be served by a United States marshal
rather than an equally trustworthy Florida sheriff, should not traverse justice.
Brown termed this requirement a "new, fresh victory for meaningless formalism." 21 His basic argument was that mere technicalities are not proper grounds
for objection. However, it is evident that the majority would never concede
that service by a Florida county sheriff, instead of a United States marshal, is
an inconsequential deviation.
Brown further contended that Federal Rule 4(c) was inapplicable in the
present case. This raises a most important question. In essence, Brown's argument was that under Rule 69 state law controls the procedure to be followed
in such a case as Tanos, except to the extent that Rule 4(c) is applicable
Rule 4(e) allows the use of state service of process procedures on "a party not
an inhabitant of or found within the state."2 Brown noted an apparent conflict
between Rules 4(c) and 4(e). While Rule 4(e) controls the manner of service,
4(c) prescribes who shall make the service. Brown believed that the reach of
Rule 4(c) was limited under 4(e) to statutes requiring personal service only.
19 34 F.R.D. 151 (D. Minn. 1964).
20 7 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 8,
64.07[21, at 1522 (2d ed. 1966).
21 United States ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 849 (5th Cir.
1966) (dissenting opinion). Brown cited his dissenting remarks in O'Neal v. United States, 264
F.2d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 1959), where he called such requirements "a harking back to the formalistic rigorism of an earlier and outmoded time."
22 United States ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., supra note 21, at 845 (dissenting opinion).
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Brown claims it was undisputed that St. Paul was a nonresident of Florida, and thus Rule 4(e) applied. However, he notes that whether Rule 4(d) (7)
or Rule 4(e) applied made no difference, since the Florida statute required the same procedure, substituted service on the state insurance commissioner, whether the insurer was
domestic, foreign, or alien. United States ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., supra
note 22, at 845 n.15.
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In other words, Brown argued that the provisions of 4(c) are binding only when
the manner of service called for by the appropriate statute must be personal.
He concluded that since the Florida statute involved substituted service of
process,24 Rule 4(c) was inapplicable, and therefore the means of service under
Florida law could validly be followed.,
As authority for this argument, Brown relied on Professor Moore's treatise
on the federal rules.25 Moore supports the proposition that there is an implied
exception to Rule 4(c) derived from the 1963 amendments to Rule 4. Under
these amendments, both the manner of service, by explicit language, and the
means of service, by implication, could be governed -by state law.2 Moore
realizes that, ideally, Rule 4(c) should also have been amended in 1963 to conform to his views. In support of his argument, he relies on the Advisory Comnittee's Notes to the 1963 amendments which appear:to substantiate his position.
But it seems that the Advisory Committee did not deem such an amendment to Rule 4(c) necessary, and in its 1963 Note took the position that Rule
4(c) is not a limitation upon service under federal' statutes or state statutes
or rules, as provided in subdivision (e) Y
Moore concludes that whenever a federal statute, or state statute or rule, calls
for "a mode of service of original process other than by personal delivery to the
'
party, the mode envisioned by the federal or state provision may be followed." 28
Moore's analysis, however, is open to question. Moore states that Rule 4(c)
does not limit Rule 4(e). However; the Advisory Committee has only stated
that Rule 4(c) does not limit Rule 4(d) (7).
It has also been held that the clause of paragraph (7) [Rule 4(d) (7)]
which permits service "in the manner prescribed by the law of the state,"
...is not limited by subdivision (c) requiring,
that service of all process
29
be made by certain designated persons.
Moore evidently extended the Advisory Committee's statement on Rule
4(d)(7) to apply to Rule 4(e). It is submitted that such a reading is not
warranted by the Committee's Notes.
However, the Advisory Committee's meaning is also far from clear. The
above quote read in context gives the impression that if you can serve process
under Rule 4(d) (7), then either federal or state means of service is permissible.
This conclusion is strengthened by the Committee's citation to Farr& Co. v. Cia.
Intercontinental De Navegacion,0 which wholly supports such a proposition.
However, the Committee also cites Sappia v. Lauro Lines,"' which holds a con24 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.0221-.0222 (1960).
25 United States ex rel. Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838, 845 n.16
(5th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
26 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 8, 1 4.08, at 1007 (2d ed. 1965).

27 Id. at 1011.
28 Ibid.

29 1963 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee Notes
156 (July 1, 1966). Perhaps this is the reason why Brown noted that under the Florida
statute substituted service was required for all insurance companies, and therefore it made
no difference whether Rule 4(d) (7) or Rule 4(e) applied. See note 23 supra.
30 243 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957).
31 130 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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trary view. Further confusion arises when the Advisory Committee goes on to
note that "the salutary results of these cases are intended to be preserved." 32
The precise meaning of this statement is unclear. A lawyer can only rely on what
he reads. From the Advisory Committee's Note, an attorney could reasonably
conclude that service by a Florida sheriff in a Florida federal district court is
proper procedure.
Likewise the rule itself is ambiguous and calls for corrective measures.
Literally interpreted, the word "manner," as used in Rule 4, would encompass
the entire method of service propounded by state law, including state means
of service. The mandatory use of Rule 4(c) would thus be extremely limited.
However, "manner" has been construed so as not to include the means of service. It is submitted that the present ambiguity should be eliminated either by
a clarification in the Advisory Committee's Note or by an amendment of the
Rule.
The question remains: to what extent is Rule 4(c) binding on litigants in
the federal courts? The preliminary draft of the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would have allowed service of a summons or subpoena by a marshal;
his deputy; or any other person, not a party, who is of sound mind and at least
twenty-one years old. 4 This draft was rejected, however, and the rule was
amended to require service by a United States marshal, his deputy, or some person
specially appointed by the court. 5 This means prescribed closely followed that
previously laid down in former Federal Equity Rule 15.36 Thus, early legislative
history supports the idea of mandatory federal service of process. However, the
present state of the law concerning who may serve process in a federal court
proceeding is at best ambiguous. Certainty clearly demands explanation and
clarification from the rulemakers.
Though considerations such as needless formality and plaintiff's responsibility
for service lurked in the background in Tanos, the real import of this case lies
in its revelation of the striking ambiguity in Rule 4. Are federal means of service
to be extended to coincide with state means of service? Does Rule 4(c) apply
to 4(d) (7), 4(e), neither, or both? For a proper answer, lawyers must await a
clarification from the Advisory Committee. Until then, attorneys practicing
in federal courts will be well advised to serve process in accordance with Rule
4(c).
Theodore A. Sinars

32 Advisory Committee Notes, op. cit. supra note 29, at 156.
33 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ch. 6, § 175, at 657 (Rules
ed. 1960); 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra, 4.08 at 1007 (2d ed. 1965).
34 Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Preliminary Draft, Rule 5(b)
(May 1936).
35 Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Proposed Rule 4(c)
(April 1937). For comment on the proposed rules see Hammond, Some Changes in the
Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 629 (1937).
36 1 EDMUNDS, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 4 §§ 74, 76 (1938).

